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ABSTRACT
When most of the research efforts have been placed on the applications of Wireless 
Mesh Networks (WMNs), their security has increasingly raised academic concerns. 
Because there are always some new attacks having immunity against the existing 
prevention mechanisms, intrusion detection as a second defence has been proposed 
to mitigate the effects of malicious network intruders.
The network security is categorised into data availability, confidentiality, authenticity 
and integrity. Although cryptography mechanisms have protected the last three 
security services to some degree, the attacks against the availability are not 
straightforward to handle because it is difficult to distinguish whether service 
disruption o f a node results from random link failures or attacks.
To protect the availability of WMNs, this thesis proposes a secure Ad-hoc 
On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol as an intrusion detection 
scheme to minimize the effects of attacks, especially for the packets drop attack.
Specifically, the reputation mechanism is applied to address the issue between 
malicious attacks and random failures. To compute a consensus reputation for each 
node, the EigenTrust algorithm is utilized in AODV. Because the convergence of the 
algorithm is guaranteed by the pre-defined trusted nodes but in AODV such nodes 
are not defined, the algorithm is improved in terms of modifying initial value and 
adding a subsidiary termination condition to warrant the convergence. Besides, the 
application o f EigenTrust merges the data fusion and reputation calculation layers in 
traditional functional framework of intrusion detection.
Moreover, AODV is modified to work with EigenTrust. The Route Request (RREQ) 
message is attached extensions including reputation information and the procedure of 
processing routing messages is also correspondingly altered.
Furthermore, the improved AODV based on EigenTrust has been implemented in 
Linux. Experimental results show that it is able to select a relative reliable route 
excluding the node compromised by the packet drop attack.
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1 Introduction
1 In t ro d u c t io n
1.1 Background
N ow adays wireless communication technologies offer people an efficient and 
flexible way o f  communicating, which transfer information between two or more 
points through air instead o f  cables.
A Wireless Local Area Network (W LAN) is a kind o f  such technology, which 
enables users to access a Local Area Network (LAN) through the radio connections 
rather than traditional network cables. It extends an existing backbone wired LAN in 
large areas, for example in manufactory plants and office buildings. As shown in 
Figure 1-1, W LAN is built by connecting fixed access points to the backbone wired 
network. Each terminal user communicates with an Access Point (AP) using a 
wireless network adapter similar in function to a traditional Ethernet adapter.
W ired 
Link
=^7  W ireless
Link
(<?>) o
G atew ay
Figu re  1-1 A rch i te c tu re  o f  W L A N
Elowever, because wireless radio transmission signal attenuates with distance 
significantly, the short radio range hinders the application o f  W LAN in a large area1' 1. 
Besides, the mobility between APs is also limited so that some services like VoIP 
(Voice over IP) run unsmoothly121.
Internet
The appearance o f  a self-organized wireless networking technology named Wireless
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Mesh Network (WMN) has broken through those limitations and promoted the 
growth o f WLAN. Currently, increasing deployments of WMNs are scattered around 
us. For example, community and neighbourhood networks where mesh routers are 
placed on the roof o f houses in a neighbourhood, which serve as APs for users inside 
the houses and along the roads[3]. Another common example in our daily life is that a 
mobile phone accesses Internet service via Wi-Fi signal supplied by another one that 
is set to hotspot mode and functions as an AP.
However, the WMN also confronts increasing threats on its security, like deliberate 
disruption of service o f a network (availability). Corresponding countermeasures 
have been proposed to defend the network, such as deploying firewall, applying 
encryption mechanism, establishing authentication systems, and configuring wireless 
devices.
Different from those methods, a relative new technology named Intrusion Detection 
System (IDS) has been deployed as a line of passive defence, like a burglar alarm in 
a building. The IDS determines possible attacks on a network by auditing and 
analyzing information from a variety of sources: network interfaces, host log files, 
etc.
1.2 Motivation for Security
Security issues cannot be ignored for WMNs when they are deployed, because such 
networks are vulnerable to a variety of threats due to its dynamically changing 
topology, absence o f conventional security infrastructures as well as open 
communication medium. So, in operation, relevant security measures must be 
considered.
1.2.1 The Need for Defence
A widely used method for warranting the security of WMN is by deploying a firewall 
to prevent attacks, but, learnt from experience, there are always some new attacks 
having immunity against the existing prevention method. It is necessary to deploy a 
kind of system that is capable of detecting potential attackers who have intruded into 
the network. Such a type of system is called Intrusion Detection System.
2
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Another countermeasure is to use a cryptography method that can transform a piece 
of message into unreadable cipher text. Only the intended recipient keeping a secret 
key can decipher the text to read. It was generally accepted that cryptographic 
methods could well guarantee the security o f data over wireless networks. Currently, 
however, encrypted messages can be cracked, especially with the assistance of 
specific software and powerful computing devices, although modem cryptography 
techniques were believed to be unbreakable. In addition, once leakage of the secret 
key occurs, a succeeded intruder could easily launch attacks to compromise a 
network. More importantly, encryption measures can only offer protection to a 
network in terms of information confidentiality, authenticity and integrity, except for 
availability. But intmsion detection is able to judge whether information and services 
are available by monitoring network activities.
In short, there is a strong demand on the intmsion detection scheme that is a 
complementation to existing security mechanisms, for resisting against the achieved 
attacker in WMNs.
1.2.2 The Need for Secure Routing Protocol
One common type of threats to WMNs is the attacks against the routing protocols 
that utilize routing messages to establish routes to destination nodes and transfer data 
packets along the established routes to the destinations.
Attacks on routing messages, such as Message Modification, Man-in-the-Middle etc., 
can be avoided by using encryption mechanism to some degree. But it is rather 
difficult to deal with the attacks against a routing behaviour of data packets. In 
general, if  a compromised node has been authenticated to participate in routing 
activities, other nodes cannot distinguish whether a legal routing message is coming 
from normal nodes or the malicious node that actually denies propagating data 
packets. Such misbehaviour causes negative effect on the availability of data over the 
network.
To mitigate impact of the misbehaviour, an indicator o f data routing behaviour 
should be placed in routing protocols for WMNs. This indicator could be a reputation
3
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metric representing the trustworthiness and the data transferability of each node in 
the network in order to avoid the impact of compromised nodes.
1.2.3 The Need for Reputation Mechanism
Due to distributed and self-organized nature of WMN, the IDS for WMN should 
depend on cooperation among nodes. That is, a node makes a decision based on its 
co-operators’ opinions, instead of acting arbitrarily in its own view. Obviously, a 
node with occasional link break should be more prone to be a data relay node, 
compared with a compromised node. But in reality it is difficult to determine that the 
dropping packets are caused by occasional link failure or a deliberate attack on the 
availability.
Reputation mechanism can be used to address this problem to some extent. In a 
reputation mechanism, each node keeps track of its neighbourhood’s behaviour and 
exchanges the records with them in order to calculate a comprehensive reputation 
value. Based on this reputation, the computing node will cooperate with the nodes 
that enjoy high reputation values later. For example, a node can select a reliable route 
including trustful nodes to transmit data packets rather than the route forwarding 
through the nodes with low reputations. However, because methods o f reputation 
calculation in many reputation schemes do not combine opinions from multiple 
nodes, different nodes generally hold various evaluations about one’s reputation. To 
address this issue, this paper employs a distributed EigenTrust[4] algorithm to 
compute a comprehensive reputation for each node in WMNs. Necessary 
modifications to the application of the algorithm is needed.
In summary, this thesis is attempting to address the issue of availability loss (packet 
dropping) resulting from an intruder who has successfully compromised a partial 
amount o f nodes in a WMN. In particular, a node is able to select the trustworthy 
partners to accomplish data transfer, meanwhile avoid those untrusted. Additionally, 
this kind o f method also enhances the tolerance to the compromised nodes in the 
WMN.
4
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1.3 Contributions
The major contribution of this thesis is developing a reputation based routing 
protocol for intrusion detection to mitigate the effects of the attacks on the data 
availability of WMNs.
Specifically, the distributed EigenTrust[4] algorithm is improved in Chapter 4 to 
calculate the reputation of every node in a WMN. The convergence of the algorithm 
can be guaranteed in any situation when trusted nodes are pre-defined. But, most 
routing protocols for WMNs do not assume the pre-trusted nodes. Therefore, the 
algorithm is modified in terms of initial value and termination condition to ensure 
that the convergence of the algorithm would not be compromised when no 
pre-trusted nodes are specified.
Moreover, the functional framework of intrusion detection proposed in [5] is 
simplified and applied into practice. Section 3.4 merges the data fusion and 
reputation calculation layers in the functional framework of intrusion detection 
described in Section 3.2.2. This is because the EigenTrust algorithm can figure out 
one node’s reputation based on synthesising reputations of co-operators. The 
application of the algorithm can also eliminate the interference due to temporary or 
occasional link fault.
Furthermore, based on the improved EigenTrust algorithm and the simplified 
functional framework, a secure AODV[6] routing protocol is designed in Chapter 5 as 
an intrusion detection scheme for WMNs. The proposed secure AODV does not 
change any field size in the routing messages of AODV but attaches reputation 
extensions to the standard route request message of AODV in order to implement 
EigenTrust into AODV. Every extension includes trustworthiness of a rater and a 
ratee as well as their identities. Each node calculates its own reputation based on the 
data in its received extensions. Also, the procedure of processing routing messages is 
correspondingly altered slightly.
Finally, the secure AODV is developed and implemented in Linux operating system.
Details in the implementation are also illustrated and experimental results show that
the implementation can keep away from abnormal nodes having been compromised
5
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by the packet drop attack.
Overall, this thesis makes contributions to the security of the data availability of 
WMNs. An EigenTrust based AODV routing protocol for intrusion detection, 
co-operatively computing the comprehensive reputation for every node in WMNs, is 
implemented to mitigate the availability loss resulting from the packets drop attack.
1.4 Scope and Limitation
It is should be pointed out that the implementation in this thesis is not a versatile 
solution to all security issues o f WMNs.
First, this thesis does only concentrate on mitigating the impact of the packet drop 
attack that causes the data availability loss in WMNs. Of course, other attacks on 
availability, e.g., Rushing attack and Wormhole attack, can also be resisted to some 
extent, since these attacks both aim to drop packets.
Second, the implementation does not supply protection against attacks on 
confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of WMNs. Because cryptography has been 
used to satisfy those three security requirements, such as public-key and digital 
signature. Of course, existing encryption mechanisms can be employed to strengthen 
our intrusion detection scheme.
1.5 Thesis Organization
Chapter 2 generalizes the challenges in the WMN and then concentrates on the 
security attacks faced by the WMN. At last, it presents the corresponding 
countermeasures to the threats against confidentiality, authenticity and integrity, and 
introduces the intrusion detection to overcome the attack on availability.
Chapter 3 describes the conventional system architectures and approaches of 
intrusion detection. Then it reviews the recent research about the distributed, 
cooperative and reputation based intrusion detection schemes that are the basis of our 
intrusion detection system.
Chapter 4 describes and stimulates a reputation algorithm named EigenTrust. After
6
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that, it brings the algorithm into our intrusion detection scheme. Furthermore, some 
issues in the application of the algorithm are addressed.
Chapter 5 illustrates an improved AODV routing protocol based on the EigenTrust 
algorithm. Besides, a testbed is set up and the experimental procedure is depicted. 
The experimental results show that the improved AODV is able to select a relative 
trustworthy path to avoid the node compromised by the packet drop attack.
Chapter 6 concludes this thesis and gives out the direction o f further work.
7
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2 Wireless Mesh Network
The wireless mesh network is different from a traditional wired network in terms of 
architecture and transmission media. The differences result in that the existing 
solutions, e.g., routing protocols and security mechanisms, for the wired networks 
are not necessarily valid for the WMNs. To support the feasibility of the 
implementation of intrusion detection developed in the following chapters, the 
unique characteristics and the security challenges faced by WMNs are enunciated in 
this chapter.
2.1 Architecture
As shown in Figure 2-1, the WMN is often composed o f mesh clients, APs and one 
or more gateways. The clients are often laptops, mobile phones and other wireless 
devices while the mesh APs, which extend the WLAN and form the mesh network, 
transfer network traffic to and from the gateway that may, but not necessary, connect 
to the Internet. Unlike WLAN where an AP only transfers data to the end users 
within its transmission range and communication between the users must be 
completed via APs, every node (i.e., APs and clients) in the WMN collaborates to 
propagate data and both clients and APs can directly transfer data to the intended 
receiver in their coverage without the assistance of the third party.
The WMN is a mix of the fixed and mobile wireless devices. It is regarded as one 
type of wireless ad-hoc network where each node is capable of participating 
communication without the support of pre-deployed infrastructures like APs in the 
WLANs and routers in the wired networks. Therefore, the existing approaches, such 
as routing protocols, proposed under the background o f ad-hoc networks^ are also 
valid for WMNs.
Due to their popularity and vulnerability to the attacks, the WMN is drawing the 
attention of network attackers. For instance, the routing protocol generally becomes a 
victim of attacks that decrease the network performance.
2 Wireless Mesh Network
Internet
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2.2 Characteris tics and Challenges
The wireless mesh network possesses different characteristics from the traditional 
wired network and also faces the inherent challenges in ad-hoc networks.
Firstly, the wireless medium is an open, shared, and broadcast medium. Any person, 
including an attacker, can capture and analyse the traffic by monitoring the radio 
medium in the WMN. This leaves a door open for malicious attackers.
Another special nature o f  W M N is self-organisation. A mesh node may be mobile so 
that the topology o f  W M N sometimes changes. In addition, wireless connections 
may fail occasionally, due to signal noise, channel interference, traffic congestion 
and so on. So the WMN is capable o f  self-management and self-healing.
Moreover, radio path loss is severer in the wireless environment than in the wired. It 
is widely accepted that wireless radio transmission signal attenuates with distance. 
According to the classical physics, the attenuation o f  radio signal is proportional to 
the inverse square o f  distance. Moreover, experimental evidence shows that it is 
actually far greater than that, especially for indoor environments. Consequently, 
nodes in a wireless network probably have relatively limited coverage, which results 
in acquiring limited information only about local range.
Furthermore, the short transmission range leads to that wireless signal must be
9
Swansea University
relayed by intermediate nodes if a sender node intends to communicate with a remote 
receiver. But available channel capacity to users in each AP declines rapidly as more 
intermediate APs are added[8]. Thus, the routing protocols for WMNs should not only 
offer multi-hop routing but also optimize routing behaviour to reduce unnecessary 
transmissions overhead.
Therefore, the above discussed challenges deserve careful consideration in the 
application o f WMN technologies. Specific protocols for ad-hoc networks have been 
proposed to endue mesh nodes autonomous, multi-hop transmission and to optimise 
the transmission overhead. The next section describes a particular routing protocol 
for ad-hoc networks, and following that, the security challenge of WMN are 
illustrated.
2.3 Routing Protocols for Wireless Mesh Networks
A routing protocol for a WMN is responsible for deciding behaviour of nodes that are 
not familiar with the topology of the network. In general, the routing protocol for 
WMN can be divided into two types: proactive (table driven) and reactive (on 
demand) protocols. Even though the routing protocols are originally designed for 
ad-hoc networks, they also can be used in WMNs.
2.3.1 Proactive Routing Protocol
Proactive routing protocols maintain routes to all destinations as a form of routing 
table, regardless o f whether or not these routes are needed. A node must periodically 
send routing messages in order to maintain up-to-date route information. Therefore, 
proactive routing protocols generate much transmission overhead, since routing 
messages are still sent out when there is no data packet, even though a node can 
quickly obtain route information to an intended destination compared with reactive 
routing protocols.
2.3.2 Reactive Routing Protocol
Reactive routing protocols do not maintain routing information to all nodes. Each 
node only stores routing information about its relay node and destination node. A
10
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node only searches or updates a route to a destination when it has a need to send or 
forward data packets. So, reactive routing protocols do not consume unnecessary 
routing overhead to maintain its routing table although they probably spend more 
time on route finding, compared against proactive protocols.
1) AODV Routing Protocol
AODV is a typical reactive routing protocol. It establishes a route to a destination 
only on demand by transmitting and receiving routing messages such as RREQ, 
RREP, RERR, and HELLO.
(1) Route Discovery
Figure 2-2 assumes that each node merely knows who its neighbours are using 
HELLO messages explained later. Node S is attempting to send data to the 
destination D but it has not established a route to D. So, it generates and broadcasts a 
Route REQUEST (RREQ) message to ask its neighbours (i.e., A and B) for a route to 
D. When the neighbours received such a RREQ, they separately increase the Hop 
Count field of the RREQ by 1 and forwarded the message to their own neighbours 
because so far they have not known any information about the destination yet. It 
should be noted that the source node S will also receive its own RREQ back from A 
and B. In this situation, S just ignores and discards this message. Similarly, node A 
does not also broadcast the same RREQ which it has forwarded before.
If the propagation of the RREQ goes continually, at last the RREQ message will 
arrive at the expected destination (D) with help of intermediate nodes (e.g., node B). 
Once D recognises that its IP address is identical with the field of Destination IP 
Address included in the RREQ, it will launch a route reply for responding to the 
RREQ.
li
Swansea University
F ig u re  2-2  R o u te  D isco very
(2) Route Response
Different from the broadcasted RREQ, a Route REPLY (RREP) is a unicasted 
routing m essage back to the originator o f  a corresponding RREQ. If  an interm ediate 
node has a route to a destination during the propagation o f  the RREQ, it will reply 
the RREQ on behalf o f  the destination. Otherw ise, like in Figure 2-3, only the 
destination D itse lf replies the RREQ by unicasting a RREP back to the upstream  
node B.
It probably happens in AODV that a node receives m any same RREQs routed by 
different neighbours. To m inim ize unnecessary routing overhead, nodes only reply 
the first com ing RREQ with the same sequence number. The sequence num ber has 
sim ilar function as time stam p, identifying a m essage and indicating how fresh it is. 
Every time a node generates any type o f  routing m essage, it will increase its own 
sequence num ber counter by 1.
W hile the RREP is forw arded back toward the RREQ source in Figure 2-3, its Hop 
Count field is increm ented by 1 at each node as well. Thus, when S receives the 
RREP, it can know the distance in hops to the destination by the Hop Count. If S 
does not receive a reply within a specified time, it will rebroadcast a new RREQ with 
a larger sequence number.
12
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F igure  2-3 R ou te  R eply
(3) Route Selection
Shortest Path First (SPF) is often w idely used in netw ork routing protocols (no 
exception to AODV) to select a route. For exam ple, if  a RREQ source node receives 
several RREPs with the sam e sequence num ber com ing from various paths, it will 
find the RREP with the least hops, and then the neighbour that forwarded the RREP 
back will be selected as a relay to forward data packets.
(4) N eighbours M anagem ent
Nodes learn o f  their neighbours through two ways. In phrases o f  start-up or no data 
packets to send, a node keeps acquaintance with its neighbours by broadcasting a 
HELLO m essage, a special RREP m essage, which is only allowed to spread over one 
hop.
The other way is through the dissem ination o f  the RREQ. W henever a node receives 
a RREQ from a neighbour, it updates its local connectivity entries about this 
neighbour.
(5) Route M aintenance
Every node m aintains two types o f  routing tables storing route inform ation, nam ely a 
reverse routing table and a forw ard routing table. The reverse route is set up for 
unicasting the RREP back to a source. W hile the RREP is unicasted by each 
interm ediate node, a forward route heading to a destination is established as well.
W hen receiving a broadcasted RREQ from an upstream  node, a node inserts a
13
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reverse route to the upstream node in its reverse routing table if it does not have such 
a route. If it has such one route but the route’s hop count is greater than the one in the 
RREQ and the route’s sequence number is equal to that of the RREQ, the node 
updates the route entry about the upstream node in local reverse table. If the 
sequence number of the RREQ is larger than the reverse route’s, the node updates the 
reverse route regardless o f the hop count because it thinks that the reverse route is 
stale.
Similarly, the route update also occurs in forward routing table during the RREP 
relaying. If a relay node notices that its sequence number of a route to the destination 
of the RREP is less than the one in the RREP, it directly replaces with the route in the 
RREP. But if the two sequence numbers are equal, the node compares existing hop 
count with the one in the RREP to decide if to update the corresponding route.
Connectivity failure is another factor leading to route update. If a node no longer can 
track a neighbour by the HELLO message, it firstly finds out the routes including this 
neighbour in routing table and marks them as invalid. Then it broadcasts a RERR 
message about the neighbour to other ones. When another node receives this error 
message, it deletes all the routes containing that failure node from routing table. It 
then upwards unicasts the error message to the neighbours who forwarded RREQ 
messages to it before so that they update relevant routes.
2.4 Objectives o f  Wireless Mesh Network Security
As mentioned above, the routing protocols play an important role in solving some 
unique challenges of WMN. Unfortunately, the initial design of routing protocols for 
WMN assumes the network is the secure environment so the security has not been 
taken into account. In practice, if once the protocols are compromised by a malicious 
intruder, those unique challenges of WMN will be difficult to handle.
So the security issue in the WMN cannot be ignored. For the WLAN technology, 
basic security objectives can be characterised in terms of confidentiality, authenticity, 
integrity and availability. Because the WMN technology derives from WLAN, the 
security of WMN can also be measured at these perspectives.
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1) Availability
Availability assures that information will be accessible for others whenever and 
wherever required.
2) Confidentiality
Confidentiality means that information being transferred through the network should 
be readable only to the intended recipient.
3) Authenticity
Authenticity warrants that received information originates from the intended sender, 
i.e., verification about the identity of the data.
4) Integrity
Integrity guarantees that received information is identical with what the intended 
sender actually transmitted without being modified by the third party in transit.
2.5 Classification o f Attacks in Wireless Mesh Networks
As discussed earlier, the characteristics of WMN are contributed to the unique 
challenges, such as vulnerability to attacks, limited available channel capability, 
multi-hop routing and so on. Among these issues, the realm of security for WMNs 
needs to be paid more attention.
Although both wired and wireless networks face the security threats, wireless 
networks suffer from a number of unique threats which wired networks are generally 
not required to deal with. For example, an attacker is able to easily intrude into a 
WMN just by being in range of the network and intercept transmission data through 
the air. But this situation hardly occurs in wired networks because of the physical 
protection to the transmission media.
The attacks in wireless networks can be classified by a number of different criteria. 
Based on the domain/sources o f attacks, the attacks in wireless networks are 
classified into insider attacks and outsider attacks[9]. The insider is someone who has 
been entrusted by the network, and also may have knowledge of the network
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topology. On the contrary, the outsider, who attem pts to acquire access to an 
authorized identification, does not pertain the dom ain o f  the network.
A lternatively, security attacks against the W M N are typically divided into passive 
and active attacks1'01 in Figure 2-4. Then these two broad classes can be subdivided 
into tour types o f  attacks on the basis o f  security services, i.e., availability, 
confidentiality, authenticity and integrity.
M essage Reply
—  Traffic A nalysis
W orm hole
Rushing
Packet Drop
Eavesdropping
M an-in-the-M iddle
M essage M odification
—  Fake Error M essage
A ctive
Integrity
Authentication
Availability
Confidentiality
Security Attacks
Passive
F igure  2-4  C la ss if ic a t io n  o f  T ypical A t tac k s  in W M N s
2.5.1 Passive Attacks
A passive attack is the one in which the intruder intercepts but does not modify 
m essages in any way. In practise, the passive attack usually takes the form  o f  a 
com bination with an active attack described in Section 2.5.2.
1) Attacks on Confidentiality
Attacks on confidentiality are harm less as long as they did not com bine with those
active attacks. In this kind o f  attacks, the attacker audits all the data that is exchanged
between its neighbouring nodes, and then gets content o f  data packets, locates some
nodes that are vital for the functioning o f  other nodes. Once these sorts o f
inform ation are known, the attacker can successfully launch any o f active attacks.
Generally speaking, there are two types o f  threats against the confidentiality:
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eavesdropping and traffic analysis.
•  Eavesdropping
A eavesdropping attacker monitors wireless data transmissions between nodes for 
obtaining message content, such as passwords^101. An example of this attack is an 
attacker listening to transmissions between the AP and the mesh client in the WMN.
•  Traffic Analysis
In traffic analysis, attacker can deduce some information by monitoring the 
transmissions for patterns of communication. In general, the greater the number of 
messages observed, or even intercepted and stored, the more can be inferred from the 
traffic[11]. In particular, the adversary is able to locate a particular AP by analysing 
the flow size of traffic. Because the mesh clients nearer the mesh AP forward a 
significantly greater number of packets than those further away from the AP, in the 
same manner that a river grows wider as it collects more water from its tributaries[12].
2.5.2 Active Attacks
An active attack is the one in which the intruder may transmit messages, replay old 
messages, modify messages in transit, or discard selected messages. It aims to 
compromise the network security in terms of availability, authenticity and integrity.
1) Attacks on Availability
•  Packet Drop
A packet drop attack is a type of attack where a router or an intermediate node should 
have forwarded packets, but discards them instead. In a WMN, if a node drops all of 
incoming packets including routing messages and data packets, it has minor effect on 
the network because it will not be selected as a relay to forward packets. It seems that 
this isolate node does not exist in the network.
However, if  a malicious node takes participation in routing activities and claims
having the shortest route to a destination but actually refuses to relay data packets, all
traffic will be directed to the node and be discarded in accordance with its will.
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Consequently, such an abnormal behaviour will lower the availability of services of 
the network.
What is worse, sometimes a malicious node accomplishes packet forwarding from 
time to time, i.e., only dropping packets for a particular network destination, 
forwarding a packet every n packets, or randomly selecting packets to forward. This 
is so called Grey-hole attack. Such type o f attack is often not straightforward to be 
detected and distinguished because network traffic still passes through the malicious 
node and accidental link failure also appears to drop packets.
•  Rushing Attack
To limit the overhead of transmission, routing protocols for ad-hoc networks 
generally allow each node to forward only one RREQ originated from any Route 
Discovery process. Moreover, each node only forwards the first arrived RREQ from 
each Route Discovery and discards the following ones. For this kind of property, in 
rushing attack the malicious node forwards RREQ faster than any other normal 
nodes in a network and hence ensures that it can be chosen as a relay in the route to a 
destination. Once such attack achieved, the malicious node is able to successfully 
launch the above packet drop attack.
•  Wormhole
In a wormhole attack, after a wireless or wired link (called as wormhole link) is 
established, two malicious nodes (wormholes) can replay each other’s messages in 
their own radio range. As a result, a route passing through the wormholes seems to be 
the shortest path between a source and a destination node.
An example is shown in Figure 2-5 where X and Y are the two wormhole nodes. X 
replays in its neighbourhood (area A) everything that Y heard in its own 
neighbourhood (area B), and vice versa[13]. Consequently, the node S in area A 
regards the node D in area B as its neighbours, and vice versa. So packet stream 
originating from or forwarded by node S flow towards destination D are guided to 
the way of wormhole link. In this situation, the wormhole node X can start packet 
drop attack leading to network disruption.
18
2 Wireless Mesh Network
A W orm hole
Link
F igure  2-5 W o rm h o le  A ttack
2) A ttacks on Authenticity
•  M an-in-the-M iddle
The M an-in-the-M iddle attack is a kind o f  active eavesdropping attack resulting in
that two com m unicating parties believe that they are exchanging inform ation with 
each other but not so in fact. For instance, in Figure 2-6, at the beginning the two 
nodes A and B have established an original com m unication connection allow ing 
them  com m unicating directly. But later the m alicious node M im personates B to 
reply A's route request, and vice versa. At last, M m akes the two victim s think that 
they are still connected with each other directly. Consequently, the m essages that A 
sends to B will be relayed by M, and vice versa. That is, since then M can read or 
modify the content o f  conversation betw een A or B.
F ig u re  2-6  M a n - in - th e -M id d le  A ttac k
•  Fake Error M essage
An attacker m ay fabricate and propagate a false Route Error m essage over a netw ork 
on behalf o f  a particular node, which causes other nodes to rem ove this node from 
their routing table. As a result, these nodes continuously initiate new route request 
m essages, and thus unnecessarily consum e resources: transm ission capability and 
energy.
O riginal C on nection
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In a message replay attack, an attacker eavesdrops and obtains a copy of an 
encrypted message sending to a particular recipient, and in a while the attacker 
retransmits the captured message on behalf of the original node of the message in 
attempt to be accepted by the recipient.
3) Attacks on Integrity 
•  Message Modification
All the nodes send, receive or forward data packets over ad-hoc networks, depending 
on their route entries. Message modification attacks aim to alter the routing message 
(e.g., route request or route reply) that are available to every node in the network.
Take AODV as an example. An attacker may change vital information, such as 
sequence number and hop count, contained in AODV routing messages to cause 
incorrectly entries update in other nodes’ routing table. In this way, the attacker could 
be prone to be selected as a relay and attract data traffic over the network, which is 
convenient for the attacker to start the packet drop attack.
2.6 Security Countermeasures
2.6.1 Information Encryption
A technical method of enhancing confidentiality, authenticity and integrity protection 
is using the two schemes: public-key and digital signature both based on encryption 
algorithm.
1) Public-key
The public-key scheme is different from the traditional and intuitive cryptographic 
mechanism known as private-key where both the message sender and receiver share 
the same secret key. The shared secret key must be distributed to them in a safe 
manner. Once an attacker learned one key, he or she can crack all encrypted 
information afterwards.
Therefore, to address the drawbacks o f private-key, the first public-key method was
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developed at the British Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ)[14]. In 
this method, users can communicate over a public channel without having to agree 
on a common shared key beforehand.
The public-key scheme requires a pair of keys: a public key and a private key. The 
first one is to encrypt a message. The other is to decrypt the cipher message. Figure 
2-7 illustrates how they work together. First, Bob disseminates his own public key to 
everyone, e.g., Alice, in his communication network. Then, if Alice intends to 
transmit a message to Bob, she encrypts her message using the received public key of 
Bob. After Bob received Alice’s cipher message, he uses its own private key to 
decrypt the cipher message for reading.
©
{©. Bob's Public Key 
^  © ^
Encrypt M sg with 
the Public K ey
Bob’s Prive Key
®P
Decrypt M sg with 
the Private Key
Alice Bob
Figure 2-7 Public-key Scheme
The premise of this cryptography scheme is that it is easy to compute the pair of keys 
but, reversely, difficult for anyone to figure out the private key based on one’s 
knowledge about the public key. Under this condition, messages from Alice are only 
readable for Bob, instead of others. Obviously, the confidentiality of messages is 
protected by the public-key scheme.
2) Digital Signature
In addition to the encryption, the public-key cipher algorithm can also be applied into 
the digital signature scheme to ensure the authenticity and integrity o f a message. An 
example can be seen from Figure 2-8.
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Figure 2-8 Digital Signature Scheme
Firstly, to guarantee that Bob will receive the genuine message from her, Alice 
propagates her public key to him in advance. After that, she signs a message with her 
own private key. The signature is a snapshot of the message content. At last, Bob 
receives this signed message and verifies the signature using the public key of Alice 
to check the authenticity and integrity o f the message.
Notice that the cryptography is valid for overcoming the threats to the confidentiality, 
authenticity and integrity but not ideal for the availability.
In addition, the public-key cryptography uses a mathematical “one-way function” to 
generate the keys, which has been seemed as sufficiently secure for decades. 
However, with technological progress, some wireless network software (e.g. Cain & 
Abel) can crack a number of cipher algorithms (e.g., RSA) based on one-way 
function to recover encrypted information. By such techniques, an attacker can be 
trusted by other nodes, gain the wanted information, and launch attacks in a WMN.
So, to deal with this adverse situation, the intrusion detection should be introduced 
into WMNs for determining whether malicious users or devices have already 
intruded and compromised some nodes.
2.6.2 Intrusion Detection
As another line of defence, Intrusion Detection (ID), described in next chapter, is a 
type of security technique for wired and wireless networks. The Intrusion Detection 
System (IDS) gathers and analyzes information from various areas within a network 
to identify possible security threats.
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2.7 Summary
This chapter first presents the unique challenges caused by the characteristics of 
wireless mesh networks. Then it concentrates on the security issues faced by WMNs. 
In particular, it categorises the attacks on routing protocols in accordance with 
security objectives of wireless networks. At last, it gives out corresponding 
countermeasures to the threats on confidentiality, authenticity and integrity, and 
introduces the intrusion detection overcoming the adverse situation that an attacker 
has intruded and been trusted by a network.
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3 Intrusion Detection
Since the recent years have seen a dramatic increase in attacks against Wireless Mesh 
Networks, intrusion detection is proposed for detecting the actions that attempt 
compromising the security of a resource[15]. Intrusion detection can be viewed as a 
passive defence[16], like the burglar alarm in a building which responds after an 
abnormal event happened. A system that performs intrusion detection is called the 
Intrusion Detection System (IDS).
Even though IDS in WMNs has a number of similarities to its counterpart in wired 
networks in terms of system structures and analysis approaches to attacks, intrusion 
detection techniques applied in wired networks cannot be directly transplanted to 
WMNs in view of their decentralized nature, dynamic network topology, and easy 
access to the radio medium for attackers[16].
As well as introducing the general architectures and analysis approaches o f the IDS, 
this chapter investigates existing intrusion detection and reputation schemes for 
WMNs in order to show the feasibility o f a reputation based intrusion detection 
scheme for packet drop attack.
3.1 Intrusion Detection Architecture
Typically, there are three types o f IDS. The first type is host-based system 
monitoring a host’s system files and packets passing through the host to detect the 
abnormal events. The second one is network-based system which is placed at 
strategic points within a network to provide maximum inspection of all network 
traffic[17]. The last one is a combination of the two types of IDS.
3.1.1 Host-based Detection
Host-based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) is a typical example of independent 
detection. It records internal events of a system into log files and periodically scans 
these files for abnormal activity. If a suspicious event is detected, a notification will
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be emitted. Another host-based approach monitors all incoming and outgoing packets 
on the host’s network interfaces.
It is admitted that the HIDS can tell if  a potentially malicious behaviour actually 
happened at the current host due to its overall scope of log files about the local 
system. In addition, the host is the best position to counter any attacks in a network. 
So it is appropriate for protecting an individual host from being intruded.
However, the HIDS has infrequent interaction with outside or does not provide any 
data for others in the whole network. Also, compared with its counterpart 
Network-based Intrusion Detection, it consumes more processing resource of the 
local host.
3.1.2 Network-based Detection
Network-based Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) monitors and collects network 
traffic to analyses the purpose of the traffic. So far, the basic automatically analysis 
methods towards attacks used in NIDS are generally classified as knowledge-based 
(misuse) detection and behaviour-based (anomaly) detection.
1) Knowledge-based Detection
Knowledge-based detection is also known as misuse or signature detection because it 
relies on a single or composite signature representing characteristics of an attack. A 
signature could be created based on the content or header of a packet. Signatures can 
be described as a boolean relation called rule[18]. If a matching between signatures 
and observed traffic is found based on past experience and rules, an alert o f intrusion 
behaviour is to be emitted.
An advantage of signature detection is its accuracy. If a signature matches, that 
signature identifies a specific attack. Knowledge of the specific type of attack means 
that an appropriate response can be determined immediately^161.
However, knowledge-based detection has several limitations. First, a slight change in 
the attack scenario is possibly enough to alter the attack signature and thus fool a 
signature filter1181. Second, such detection can only recognise those specific attacks
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whose corresponding signatures have formed. That requires continuous work of 
updating signatures of the new attacks that have been evolving. Consequently, 
knowledge-based detection could not detect a number of new attacks even though it 
has a low rate of the false positive error in which a non-match is declared to be a 
match.
2) Behaviour-based Detection
Behavior-based detection, also named anomaly detection, is totally different from 
knowledge-based detection. It discovers intrusion behavior by the patterns o f normal 
network traffic. If the history of an activity does not resemble any normal pattern, the 
activity can be assumed to be abnormal. (On the contrary, knowledge-based detection 
tries to characterize attacks, and everything else is assumed to be normal[16].) The 
patterns are constructed by statistical analysis of the observation about past normal 
behavior. Once the patterns have been set up, intrusion activities can be recognised 
from the normal ones whose statistics patterns deviate from those of malicious 
behavior.
A major advantage of behavior-based detection is the potential to detect new attacks 
without prior experience. That is, a signature for a new attack is not required; a new 
attack will be recognised if it significantly deviates from the normal behavior[16].
In the other hand, the accuracy of this detection depends on the deviation between 
the patterns of the normal and abnormal activity. If the deviation is not enough 
significant, the behavior-based detection will be vulnerable to high rate o f the false 
negative error (an actual match is not detected). Besides, an event assumed anomaly 
is not necessarily malicious.
3.1.3 Hybrid Detection
In practice, to overcome the limitations of purely Host or Network based IDS, and to 
combine the strength of them, researchers have proposed Hybrid Intrusion Detection 
System (HIDS), which allows user to mix the signature based and the anomaly based
r 191strategies1 J.
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3.2 Intrusion Detection for WMNs
Due to the open and shared nature o f the wireless medium mentioned in Section 2.2, 
intrusion detection techniques for traditional wired networks cannot be copied over 
to WMNs. Additionally, the autonomous property of mesh nodes requires intrusion 
detection schemes should be decentralized. Therefore, new distributed intrusion 
detection schemes must be designed for the WMN[16].
3.2.1 Distributed Intrusion Detection
The WMN is distributed by nature and requires nodes to be cooperative. A survey of 
intrusion detection schemes proposed for WMNs is given out in this section and most 
of them are tightly related to routing protocols. These schemes share some common 
concepts but differ in the details. Additionally, the shortcomings of each scheme are 
described as well.
1) Cooperative Anomaly Detection
Zhang and L e e ^  developed a distributed and cooperative anomaly detection scheme 
for the MANET, and evaluated such scheme with the DSR[21] and AODV routing 
protocols. From the perspective of functions, the scheme consists of three functions: 
monitoring, analysis and response. The basic of this scheme is that each node is 
responsible for detecting signs of intrusion independently. If necessary, neighbouring 
nodes can collaboratively investigate an activity in a broader range.
Specifically, the function of detection is in the charge of an individual agent at each 
node. Each agent audits local events such as systems activities, and communication 
activities within its radio range. If it has strong confidence in a decision about an 
intrusion activity based on local traces, it will respond to the suspicious activity 
individually. But if it has an inconclusive evidence of an anomaly, a broader 
detection will be triggered: IDS agents at its neighbouring nodes will together 
involve in performing global intrusion detection and response. These individual IDS 
agents collectively constitute the IDS defending attacks in MANET.
The anomaly detection is utilized as intrusion analysis approach in the scheme.
Based on information-theoretic measures, entropy and conditional entropy are used
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to describe the characteristics of normal information flows. And two classification 
algorithms (Decision-tree and Support Vector Machine, SVM) are responsible for 
building anomaly detection models for the attacks on routing protocols. It is also 
discussed in [20] that such analysis mechanism can be implemented in other layers of  
the wireless networks.
Intrusion response depends on the type of intrusion, the type of routing protocols and 
applications, and the confidence in the evidence^201. One common intrusion response 
in this proposed scheme is re-computing a route to avoid compromised nodes. The 
other response action is to re-authenticate two nodes connecting to a suspicious link. 
The former one is more often used because the performance of the latter is subject to 
authentication credentials. For an insider attacker, the re-authenticating measure is 
not effective because it has been trusted by the network.
2) Watchdog and Pathrater
Marti et al.[22] described and applied two techniques, watchdog and pathrater, into the 
DSR routing protocol for mitigating the effect of the node that agrees to forward 
packets but fail to do so. The experimental results show that the two techniques can 
minimize the effect of this type of misbehaviour while increasing the throughput of 
the network.
The watchdog is a process running at each node to monitor the behaviour of the next 
hop. Figure 3-1 illustrates how the watchdog works. Suppose that S, having a route 
to D via intermediate nodes A, B and C, attempts to send a packet to D. Before A 
forwards the packet for S, it first stores the packet in a buffer. Once the packet is 
forwarded, the watchdog at node A monitors the next hop B to ensure whether B 
forwards the packet to C. If a forwarded packet from B is captured by A (shown by 
dotted lines) and the packet is also identical to what has been stored in the buffer of 
A, it then can be deemed that B has successfully forwarded the packet to C (shown 
by solid lines) on behalf of A. And then the packet buffered in A is removed. 
Otherwise, if no captured packet matches the buffered packet within a specific time, 
the watchdog will increase the failure counter o f node B.
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Figure 3-1 Watchdog Operation
The pathrater computes a path metric for every path to avoid malicious node. 
Specifically, each node rates other nodes it knows between 0 and 1. The path metric 
is calculated by the averaging rating of every node along a path and the connection 
reliability obtained from previous experience. If there are more than one path to the 
same destination, the path with the highest metric will be selected while another path 
including misbehaving nodes is avoided.
Although the two techniques are capable of mitigating the effect of the misbehaviour, 
this scheme also brings into the following weaknesses. First, it approximately 
doubles the transmission overhead within scenarios of moderate mobility and 
extreme mobility, respectively. Second, the rating o f the watchdog is obtained by 
monitoring the traffic through its host node without referring to any external opinion, 
so the result is thus prone to be one-sided. Thirdly, calculation about the path metric 
is based on that the pathrater is clear about the route which a packet passes through. 
This means that the calculation is completely performed by the sender of the packet. 
Lastly, a misbehaved node could be detected until its dropping packets surpass a 
given threshold.
3) Brief Comparison
The basic idea of the above intrusion detection schemes is monitoring the packet 
traffic within radio range. They audit the network traffic by the IDS agent at each 
node and the watchdog, respectively. Zhang and Lee[20] did not illustrate the data 
collection process in detail, they just defaulted that network data could be accessed 
through a certain way. But Marti et al.[22] presented that the watchdog could complete 
such collection work.
With respect to functions, the IDS agent is more complex than the watchdog. The 
agent can make a decision for responding to a suspicious behaviour by itself. But the 
watchdog only concentrates on packets monitor and analysis, not considering related 
response.
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Seen from the perspective of analysis approach to intrusion, the IDS agent utilizes 
behaviour-based detection method to recognise normal and anomalous activity. It 
develops a pattern of normal activity by a SVM classifier which needs training data 
beforehand. On the contrary, the watchdog is only designed for detecting behaviour 
of dropping packets. To achieve this, the watchdog analyses the captured packet 
instead of requiring pre-processed data to build a pattern.
From the view of cooperation, a cooperative detection is requested when the IDS 
agent has not enough confidence in its detection result. A requesting node shares its 
data about the suspicious event with its neighbouring nodes, and all o f them follow a 
consensus algorithm to determine whether to generate an alert in a global scope. In 
contrast, Marti et al.[221 did not consider such a global decision because they only 
focused on detecting the packets dropping behaviour and assumed that the 
misbehaviour can be judged by a node itself independently.
Note that, decision-making relying on the cooperative participation of nodes can be 
easily misguided by false information^231. If without any countermeasure, malicious 
nodes would spread false information over a network to guide the IDS making a 
wrong decision. Therefore, the IDSs, presented in the next subsection, include 
reputation mechanism to minimize the effects from malicious nodes.
3.2.2 Reputation-based Intrusion Detection
As mentioned in Section 2.5, attacks in wireless networks can also be divided into 
the insider attack and the outsider attack. While most outsider attacks such as 
spoofing network protocols can be avoided by authentication and encryption 
schemes, insider attacks (e.g., packet drop attack) are relative harder to deal with[24]. 
Trust and security are two tightly interdependent concepts^251. It is natural to expect 
avoiding inside attacks by combining a reputation mechanism into the intrusion 
detection.
Besides, limited wireless transmission range results in partial vision about the traffic 
in wireless networks. To synthesise different local opinions of various nodes into an 
accurate result, every node should be allocated to a specific weight standing for its
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reliability. Virtually, this weight could be a reputation value that is offered by the 
reputation mechanism.
In addition, an external node can join a WMN arbitrarily, as long as it enters the radio 
range of the network. Obviously, malicious nodes are able to easily merge into the 
WMN and to negatively influence the behaviour or data of the normal ones. 
Moreover, a wireless node with limited range is likely to suffer from slow and 
dropped connections. So, unlike the wired link, wireless link cannot continuously 
ensure acceptable stability and reliability. As a result, one’s opinion may be dropped 
or distortedly transferred to others.
In view of the local vision and the vulnerability of wireless entities, nodes in the 
WMN cannot be entirely trusted. Therefore, reputation mechanism should be 
considered as a component for intrusion detection, which provides a means to 
identify misbehaved nodes. This section reviews typical reputation schemes to show 
the state of the art.
1) CONFIDANT
The CONFIDANT1261 scheme aims at detecting and isolating misbehaving nodes. 
The implementation of this scheme assumes that the network layer routing protocol 
is based on DSR. In this scheme, each node can also observe the behaviour of all its 
neighbouring nodes. The authors believe that a misbehaved node should be punished 
in a certain way rather than, like the Watchdog and Pathrater, be prohibited from 
forwarding packets to others. Also, when discovering a misbehaved neighbour, a 
node informs all other nodes not to forward packets through this neighbour as well.
In particular, the CONFIDANT system consists of Monitor, Reputation System, 
Trust Manager and Path Manager. The monitor enables each node to audit the 
behaviour of its neighbouring nodes. If an activity of its neighbour is seemed as 
suspicious, the relevant information will be passed on to the reputation system of the 
monitoring node. If this activity deviates from normal ones significantly, the 
monitoring node checks whether such the activity has occurred more often than the 
predefined threshold that is used to differentiate deliberate malicious behaviour from 
occasional coincidences such as collisions. If the threshold is exceeded, the
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reputation system gives a negative reputation rating to the monitored neighbour. If 
the reputation of the neighbour decreases to a rather low level, the neighbour’s 
information is taken over by the path manager that removes all the routes containing 
the suspicious neighbour from a path cache. In this way, the path manager can avoid 
to select a route including the misbehaved node. Moreover, an alarm message is sent 
by the trust manager of the monitoring node to warn others against the suspicious 
node. The precondition o f the whole process is that the monitoring node is trusted or 
several negative reports about the neighbour are received by the trust manager.
Since this scheme allows network nodes to send alarm messages to each other, it is 
therefore a good opportunity for the attackers to send false alarm messages about 
normal neighbours to a node in order to misguide its decisions[27].
2) CORE
CORE[28] enforces cooperation among nodes in a MANET to prevent selfish 
behaviour. Each node keeps the track of the other nodes’ collaboration and represents 
a degree of the collaboration with the reputation that is based on the monitor in 
CONFIDANT. In CORE, each node receives positive reports from others and 
calculates the reputation based on their rate of collaboration.
The main difference between CORE and CONFIDANT is that CORE does not pass 
negative ratings about other nodes through the network but CONFIDANT allows 
negative reports about others. Therefore, attacks broadcasting negative ratings for 
legitimate nodes, which CONFIDANT suffers from, are prevented.
CORE also differs from the Watchdog-Pathrater scheme. CORE was proposed as a 
generic mechanism that can be integrated with several network and application layer 
functions, even though it is only applied to monitor packet forwarding function of 
DSR using the watchdog[28]. But the Watchdog-Pathrater scheme is specifically 
designed for routing protocols.
It should also be pointed out that both CONFIDANT and CORE assign the same 
weight to each neighbour’s rating. A more reasonable scenario should be that the 
rating from a normal node is given more weight than that from a malicious one and
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thereby eliminating the interference from the misbehaved node.
3) SORI
Similarly, the SORI[29] scheme also uses the reputation information as a measure to 
counter the selfish behaviour o f a node.
Specifically, each node updates its local evaluation record for all its neighboring 
nodes periodically. If the reputation of a node in the context of forwarding packets 
changes significantly, the monitoring node informs its neighboring nodes about the 
change. Moreover, if a node receives reputation reports from multiple nodes, it 
aggregates these observation results and weights them by reputation of the sending 
nodes. Furthermore, since a node broadcasts an alarm about a misbehaved node to its 
neighbors when the reputation value of the abnormal node falls below a threshold, 
the overhead is significantly less than the CONFIDANT scheme.
4) REFACING
REFACING151 focuses on achieving a distributed anomaly detection model by 
utilizing the Dempster-Shafer[30] evidence (D-S) theory to combine detected data and 
to figure out a comprehensive reputation for a given node. Based on the reputation, 
the overall detection accuracy can be improved. In Figure 3-2, the REFACING 
system is composed of four separate functional parts: Detection, Normalization, Data 
Fusion, and Reputation Update.
The detection nodes are used to detect potential malicious behaviour in a network. 
Some specific events (e.g., a timeout for a buffered packet) will proceed to a verdict 
according to the detection node’s inner judgement. Then, the verdicts from different 
nodes are normalized in order to have a uniform view of the various responses. After 
that, the normalized data are processed by the combination rule of the D-S theory[31] 
to obtain a comprehensive judgement about the network. The difference, between the 
final overall verdict and the verdict of the detection node, is used to measure the 
level of agreement or disagreement between the network and the local node. The 
difference is also applied to update the reputation weight o f the detection node. A 
node’s updated reputation has an influence on its verdict in the next detection loop.
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Figure 3-2 Function Framework of REFACING
A breakthrough of this scheme, compared with the previously mentioned, is that it 
applies the information fusion algorithm to minimize the effects of false information. 
But it also suffers from the D-S’s inherent weakness presented in Section 4.1.3.
Besides, the authors[5] just concentrated on illustrating the applicability o f this 
scheme rather than on the capability to detect specific attacks. Furthermore, the 
papers^32,331 simulated and implemented the Reputation Update function in AODV to 
compute a reputation metric for mitigating the effects of packet drop attack, 
respectively.
One weakness of the above reputation mechanisms is that a node’s reputation is not 
unique over a given network and depends on a specific route. Although one node can 
make a conclusion based on the opinions from others, different nodes generally have 
various reputation evaluations toward the same node. As a result, a misbehaved node 
may enjoy a high reputation in some node’s eyes.
5) SOPE
In order to evaluate a node’s reputation for intrusion detection independent o f any 
specific route or path, SOPE[34] applied the EigenTrust algorithm in DSR to calculate 
a consensus reputation for every node from the perspective of a whole network.
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In particular, this scheme assigns every node a new property called ‘centrality’. The 
nodes with both high centrality and high reputation are more likely to become the 
sources for the reputation iteration. In fact, the sources play the same role as the 
pre-trusted nodes in the original EigenTrust, which guarantee that every node has a 
certain probability to converge and an ability to resist against the interference from 
malicious nodes. In addition, SOPE defines a ‘degree centrality’ to allocate higher 
weights to the highly central nodes (sources), which leads to fast reputation 
convergence. Actually, what the degree centrality increases is just the value of a  in 
equation (4-15). Because both the introduce of pre-trusted nodes and the increase of 
a  enlarge the second principle eigenvalue ( )  of a network^35^ and the convergence
rate of EigenTrust depends on the ratio of and the principle eigenvalue \  of 
the network, the convergence rate in SOPE becomes fast.
However, if the high centrality node is selected improperly, SOPE cannot ensure the 
algorithm convergent. Therefore, Chapter 4 improves the EigenTrust algorithm to 
guarantee its convergence when no pre-trusted nodes are specified, and Chapter 5 
implements the improved algorithm into AODV.
3.3 Intrusion Tolerance
Regardless of HIDS or NIDS, they should be robust enough to run continually in the 
background without human intervention^, even if a malicious insider resides. For 
this reason, intrusion tolerance is proposed by researchers.
Different from the intrusion detection, the design concept of intrusion tolerance 
assumes that it is impossible to develop a general protection mechanism against 
attacks and some of them will achieve, because not all attacks are well characterized 
and there are always unknown attacks in practice. So, in fact, intrusion tolerance is a 
fault-tolerant approach to protect networks against malicious behaviour.
For a reputation-based intrusion detection, the importance of an inside attacker’s 
opinion is determined by its reputation and the other entities’ evaluation. Thus, if 
only a certain amount of normal entities are compromised, with help of the 
reputation mechanism, the impact o f the malicious intruder will have minor impact
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on the security of the network. This reputation-based approach is thus 
intrusion-tolerant.
3.4 Detection Solution for Packet Drop Attack
Routing protocols are highly vulnerable to be attacked. Countermeasures for limiting 
the effect of attacks on routing protocol are thus becoming a mandatory requirement 
for the WMN. Especially, the packet drop attack seriously threatens the security 
(resource availability) and compromises the performance of the network.
Additionally, the continuous growth o f WMNs calls for particular solutions to their 
security. Recent research efforts have been put on how to achieve a distributed, 
cooperative and effective intrusion detection scheme for the WMN. As a result, 
information fusion algorithms are applied to combine data from multiple intrusion 
detection points distributed over the network, as shown in [5,32].
Therefore, referring to the function framework shown in Figure 3-3, the following 
chapters focus on a distributed and cooperative intrusion detection scheme that 
utilizes EigenTrust^ to synthesise a comprehensive trustworthiness for every node in 
WMNs. The trustworthiness is mapped to a reputation metric of AODV for detecting 
the nodes compromised by the packet drop attack.
Reputation Fusion
Normalization
Detection
Detection 
„ Node ,
Detection 
„ Node ,
Detection 
, Node ,
Figure 3-3 Simplified Function Framework of Cooperative IDS
36
3 Intrusion Detection
3.5 Summary
As a conventional defence scheme in wired networks, intrusion detection cannot be 
simply borrowed from wired networks to wireless networks because of those 
discussed challenges inherent in wireless media. But the traditional detection system 
architectures and approaches presented in the first section of this chapter are still 
valid for the wireless environment.
Besides, recently published research on the distributed, cooperative and reputation 
based intrusion detection schemes, which enhances the attack tolerance o f wireless 
networks, is presented in this chapter too.
Finally, the common shortcoming of existing reputation mechanisms is pointed out 
and the functional framework of intrusion detection is simplified in Figure 3-3, 
which will be associated with the EigenTrust algorithm described in Chapter 4 to 
calculate the reputation against the attacks dropping packets.
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4 Reputation Fusion for Intrusion Detection
One challenge in intrusion detection is to correctly judge whether the behaviour o f an 
entity in a network is normal or not based on the detected data. Ideally, the IDS can 
eliminate two types of errors: false positives (a non-match is declared to be a match) 
and false negatives (an actual match is not detected). Unfortunately, it is unlikely to 
avoid both errors. The IDS can only attempt to minimize both types o f error through 
some methods, e.g., relying on decisions made by reliable nodes and data fusion.
Indeed, information collected from a single source is usually limited and sometimes 
provides for low accuracy[5] or inconsistent results. For instance, methods of 
reputation calculation in many reputation mechanisms proposed in Section 3.2.2 
cannot compute a consensus reputation in the scope of a whole network such that 
different nodes generally hold various evaluations about a given node. On the other 
hand, detection from multiple sources benefits from a wider field o f vision. But it 
sometimes suffers from the dependence and the conflicts among the detected data[36], 
like the applications^37, 381 of Dempster-Shafer evidence (D-S) theory that is a 
solution of data fusion. In view of the above issues, a distributed reputation algorithm 
named EigenTrust[4], which can compute a comprehensive and consensus reputation 
for a node, is improved in terms of its initial value and termination condition in this 
chapter to implement it into AOD V.
4.1 Dempster-Shafer Evidence (D-S) Theory
Dempster-Shafer evidence (D-S) theory is a kind of reasoning algorithm based on the 
evidence theory. It was proposed by Dempster at first and then developed by Shafer, 
so it is called D-S evidence theory^3 T It is used to combine evidence (opinions) 
coming from multiple sources under a premise that all evidence is independent.
4.1.1 Introduction of D-S Theory
Suppose that Q is a sample space, consisting of a number of mutually exclusive
subsets. In this theory, a mass function • ) , also named basic probability
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assignment (bpa), expresses the proportion of all relevant and available evidence that 
supports a subset. M(f) meets the following description:
M(.)e[0,l]
M {(/>) = 0 , where (f) is an empty subset and A is a subset of Q . 
X > 0 4 ) = 1
AczQ
Besides, the D-S theory believes that the probability of an event A , P(A) , falls into 
an interval bounded by two measures called Belief and Plausibility, namely:
0 < Bel(A) < P(A) < PI (A) < 1 (4-1)
where the lower bound Bel(A) is defined as the sum of basic probability 
assignments of all subsets of A , standing for the whole belief degree of the event 
A . The function Bel(•) is defined as follows:
Bel{*)e[ 0,1]
Bel(</>) = 0 (4-2)
Bel(A) = £  M(S)
Sc.A
where S' is a subset of A.
The upper bound, Pl(A) , represents the belief degree of evidence not refusing A . It 
is the sum of basic probability assignments of all of Q ’s subsets that intersect with 
A . The function Pl(») is denoted as:
Pl(A) = 1 -  Bel(A) = 1 -  £  M(B)  (4-3)
B nA=0
where A = Q -  A and A,B c f i .
4.1.2 Combination Rule
The Dempster’s evidence combining rule provides a principle to combine two pieces 
of independent evidence. Specifically, the combination M n (») is calculated in the 
following manner:
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' X  M t (B)M2 (C)
(4-4)
0 , otherwise
(4-5)
BnC=^
where A,B,C ^  Q . If the degree of conflict between B and C leading to K= 1, the 
combination rule is invalid.
Let Bel(A) = M u (A) and according to (4-2) and (4-3) the confidence interval about
the probability of event A can be decided. The particular computation process of this 
theory can be seen from the example explained in the next subsection.
4.1.3 Limitations
D-S combining rule of evidence can make correct decision if all evidence is 
independent and not highly conflicting, but when evidences are correlative or K  = 1 
in (4-4), the combining rule may fail.
Let us consider a simple example of fault diagnosis^ for illustrating the influence of 
evidence correlation on the final combining result. Suppose that there are three 
persons: an expert, a worker and a student, they diagnose the same system fault that 
is probably caused by event X, Y, or Z that is for a normal situation.
Their diagnosis results are as follows:
Expert (E): M E(X) = 0.7, M£(Q) = 0.3;
Considering the authority of the expert, the others make the same judgement,
Worker (W): M w(X) = 0 J ,  M W(Q) = 0 3  ;
Student (S): M S(X) = 0.7, M5(Q) = 0.3;
Conversely, a reliable result given out by a testing instrument is Mj(Y) = 0.7,
namely:
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Mj  (Q) = 0.3.
According to the combining rule of D-S theory, the diagnosis of expert and worker 
are firstly combined as shown in Table 4-1.
Table 4-1 First Fusion
M e{X) = 0.7 M e(Q.) = 0.3
M w(X) = 0 J 0.49 (X) 0.21 (X)
M w (Q ) = 0.3 0.21 (X) 0 .0 9 ( 0 )
Thus, the fusion result of first step is
M x(X)  = 0.49 + 0.21 + 0.21 = 
M ] (Q ) = 0.09
0.91
After that, Table 4-2 combines the above results with the diagnosis of the student.
Table 4-2 Second Fusion
M,(20  = 0.91 M x (Q ) = 0.09
M S(X) = 0.7 0.637 (X) 0.063 (X)
M s (Q ) = 0.3 0.273 (X) 0 .0 2 7 (Q )
Similarly, the fusion result of this step is M 2(X) = 0.973 and M 2(Q) = 0.027. 
Again, the third fusion process with the instrument result is shown by Table 4-3.
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Table 4-3 Third Fusion
M 2(X) = 0.973 AT2(Q) = 0.027
Mj (7) = 0.7 0.6811 ( 0 ) 0.0189 (Y)
Mj(Q) = 0.3 0.2919 (X) 0.0081 ( Q )
Consequently, the final fusion result is as follows:
M (X )  = 0.2919 
M(T) = 0.0189 
M (  Q) = 0.0081 
M(^) = 0
It is impossible that an event stands by X and Y at the same time so M(<f>) = 0 even 
though its calculation result is not so.
According to the D-S theory, the disagreement coefficient of evidence between 
people and the instrument is computed as K  = ^  M j(Y)M2(X)  = 0.6811. Then
XnY=<!>
above results are normalized by coefficient (1 -  K ) , thus:
M (X )  = 0.2919/(1-0.6811)=0.9153 
M(Y) = 0.0189 / 0.3189=0.0593 
M(Q) = 0.0081/0.3189=0.0254
Finally, based on the equation (4-2) and (4-3) the confidence interval of X is [0.9153, 
0.9407], and the confidence interval of Y is [0.0593, 0.0847]. As a result, the system 
fault is seemed to be caused by the event X with a rather high confidence between 
[0.9153, 0.9407], but the correct diagnosis from the instrument is not considered, 
even though the instrument is generally more credible than the expert.
From the above discussion, the fusion result in the D-S theory is possibly unreliable 
when all o f raters are believed equally and the correlation between their evaluations 
is ignored. Another exam ple^ shows that highly conflicting evidence also misguide
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the theory.
Generally, indirect detection data coming from remote or unreliable nodes should be 
considered less trustworthy than that observed by adjacent neighbourhood. Therefore, 
it is necessary to assign higher trustworthiness to relative near observers having good 
performance records in a network. In addition, the D-S theory only combines two 
evidences every time. For the combination of multi-evidence, it infers a result by the 
combination of any two of them. In view of these, the EigenTrust algorithm is 
introduced to calculate a reputation for every node in a cooperative manner.
4.2 Centralized EigenTrust Algorithm
It is wildly accepted that a reputation mechanism can be applied to represent the 
reliability of nodes in networks. Reputation values in EigenTrust are classified into 
two types: local reputation and global reputation. Every local reputation at one node 
is an evaluation towards its neighbouring node. One’s global reputation represents 
the node’s trustworthiness over a whole network.
4.2.1 Local Reputation
1) Credit Rating
In the EigenTrust algorithm, a local reputation ltj is defined as the sum of credit 
ratings of individual transactions which a node i has done with a neighbour j  in 
i ’s observation. In other words, the node i observes and rates its neighbouring 
nodes and stores their credits (i.e., local reputation) that reflect / ’s opinion towards 
them.
This requires that i is able to count the number of satisfactory data transactions to j , 
denoting as satiJ, and the number of unsatisfactory events, unsaty . Then, l{j is 
computed as:
ltJ = sattj -  unsat y (4-6)
Obviously, if  there were no connection linking the two nodes i and j , the local 
reputation would be zero, namely ll} = 0 and lJt = 0.
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2) Normalization
In order to ensure the convergence of the algorithm, normalized local reputation l y , 
defined by formula (4-7), is used in computing node j ’s global reputation rather 
than ly obtained by equation (4-6).
\/n , otherwise
where n is the number of all nodes in a network. This warrants that all local 
reputation is in the same interval [0, 1].
4.2.2 Global Reputation
but the employer are familiar with the seeker’s referrers, the employer would be 
likely to evaluate the seeker according to the opinions of the referrers and to weight 
their opinions based on their own reputation.
Similarly, in an rc-node network, a natural way for the node i estimating another 
one k is that i asks its neighbours’ opinions about the node k.  Their opinions 
would also be weighted by the evaluation values from the perspective of i . This can 
be described by:
where glk represents a global reputation of a stranger k in the view of node i .
Ijk is the local reputation about node k in j ’s eyes. Clearly, the node j  is a 
broker between i and k . Extending the equation (4-8) to the entire network, we 
have a matrix notation:
I n
(4-7)
In the social network, if  a job seeker and an employer did not know each other before
(4-8)
7=1j*i,k
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~gl\ l a
8 , 2 h i
S i k
=P»T •L  J  nxn
I  ik
J i n . nx 1 I  in
(4-9)
where hj is set to 0 if  the two nodes do not directly connect with each other. The
matrix \JtJ J contains every node’s evaluations about strangers, friends, and itself.
One’s subjective evaluation about itself should be ignored, so lu does not play any 
role in EigenTrust even though they are set to a number, e.g., 1. If the global
reputation vector [g(] g l2 ••• g m ]? and the normalized vector
p/i 7/2 • • • I in ]  are denoted as g; and lt , respectively, as well as the matrix
p y J is represented by L , then the global reputation vector of node i is presented 
by:
g ,= L - h  (4-10)
As discussed in [4], equation (4-10) can only enable the node i to acquire an 
opinion about its neighbours’ neighbour, rather than more distant nodes. To apply this
equation into the entire network, the node / needs to ask its neighbour’s neighbour
— ■(2 )
for getting a wider vision, that is g, = L-(L •//). If continuing to do in this way,
the node i will have a complete view of the network after N  iterations. The 
iterative expression is as follows.
'(AO .(N-l)
g r = L - g , ......
4.2.3 Constraints
(4-11)
In fact, the above sections describe the EigenTrust algorithm for centralized networks. 
Every node can figure out the global reputation vector g  but a precondition is that 
the matrix L n must be known. Otherwise, the calculation process cannot go
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through. From another perspective, the precondition indicates that each node has 
known the topology of the entire network before the calculation is started. It is 
relatively straightforward to apply the centralized EigenTrust algorithm to proactive 
(table-driven) routing protocols because each node is responsible for maintaining a 
routing table including the routes to all destinations in a network. However, the 
situation is totally different if  the algorithm is integrated with a reactive protocol, e.g. 
AODV, because only the information about next-hop and destination nodes is known 
to each node. Therefore, Section 4.3 shows a distributed EigenTrust algorithm, and 
modifications to the algorithm for applying it into AODV are illustrated in Section 
4.4.
Additionally, the basic idea of the algorithm is to multiply the matrix Lnxn
repeatedly by a given starting vector so that the vector converges to the direction of 
the matrix’s eigenvector associating with the largest eigenvalue in absolute value1411
To achieve this, an underlying assumption is that the square matrix Lnxn is
irreducible and aperiodic. So the authors in [4] proposed equation (4-12) to transform 
Lnxn to an irreducible and aperiodic matrix for guaranteeing the convergence of
vector g .
~ { k + ] )  , 1  x r ~ (A:) ~  ( A  1g  =(1 - a ) ' L g  + a - p  (4-12)
where a  is a decimal value between 0 and 1. The vector p  represents a uniform 
probability distribution over P  pre-trusted nodes, p, = 1 / P  if  i e P (otherwise 
p, = 0). Such nodes should be carefully selected. The following simulation results 
prove that the improved algorithm is convergent.
4.2.4 Algorithm Description and Simulation
1) Simple EigenTrust Algorithm 
Equation (4-11) describes the relationship between the global reputation vector and 
the starting vector /*. According to the knowledge of linear algebra, if Lnxn is 
diagonalizable and its dominant eigenvalue is not equal to the second one, then a
non-zero starting vector can converge to the dominant eigenvector after N
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iterations. That is equivalent to saying that the non-zero starting vector does not 
affect the convergence of the global reputation vector. Therefore, a vector
n = [\/n \/n • • • 1/ r tf  , where n is the amount of nodes in a given network, can
be chosen as the starting vector in the simple centralized EigenTrust algorithm 
described in Figure 4-1 in which e is a predefined error tolerance near zero.
S tart ^
N o iff) < £~ g
Y e s
Figure 4-1 Simple EigenTrust Algorithm
Based on the algorithm description, a simulation o f 10 nodes with 20 iterations was 
performed in Matlab. Figure 4-2 shows the change of the residual error (two-norm) 
of the vector g  between before and after iterations. It can be seen from Figure 4-2 
that the global reputation vector no longer changes dramatically after several 
iterations.
2) Improved EigenTrust Algorithm
As mentioned in Section 4.2.3, to increase the convergence rate of the simple 
EigenTrust algorithm, equation (4-12) was proposed. The improved EigenTrust 
algorithm is described in Figure 4-3. And a simulation of 10 nodes with 20 iterations 
was performed as well. Besides, there are three pre-trusted nodes in this simulation. 
The simulation result, as shown in Figure 4-4, proves the feasibility o f the improved 
algorithm.
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Figure 4-2 Simple Centralized EigenTrust Convergence (£ = 0.001)
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Figure 4-3 Improved EigenTrust Algorithm
Comparing the two simulation results, it is clear that the improved algorithm 
converges faster than the simple one. That is because equation (4-12) changes the
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matrix L ’s second dominant eigenvalue A^  to the value o f a , which has been 
proved in [35\  And because the basis o f the EigenTrust is the power iteration 
algorithm whose convergence rate is determined by the ratio (A^/A^) between the 
second principle eigenvalue and the principle eigenvalue o f the matrix[42]. Hence, the 
speed of convergence of the improved algorithm is a /  A^ . As long as the chosen a
is greater than the original value of A7 , the improved method can converge faster 
than the simple one. In our simulation, the original second dominant eigenvalue is 
0.6332 which is less than the value of a  that is set to 0.8. Thus, the decay rate of 
the residual in the improved EigenTrust is greater than that o f the simple one.
0.35
0.3
0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
18 2012 14 168 1062 40
Iterations
Figure 4-4 Improved EigenTrust Convergence ( P  = 3, £  =  0.001, a  = 0 . 8 )
4.3 Distributed EigenTrust Algorithm
An idea of this thesis is to apply EigenTrust to distinguish abnormal nodes from 
normal ones in WMNs. One feature of such networks is the self-organization that is 
the process where an entity appears without a central authority or an external 
intervention. And the organization appears a globally coherent pattern by local 
interaction among entities in a parallel (all the entities act at the same time) and
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distributed (no entity is a central dictator) way[43J.
Obviously, the centralized EigenTrust algorithms described in the previous section 
can not be applied in such distributed networks. Hence, it is necessary to present a 
distributed EigenTrust[4] where all nodes in a network cooperate to calculate the 
global reputation vector and each one stores one component of the vector.
4.3.1 Properties of Distributed Computation
A process of distributed computing is completed by a part or all o f autonomous 
entities in a network, each of which has independent computing and storage units. A 
common computation task is subdivided into many small parts to such entities, and 
in general the output of each entity also interacts with others in the network to 
different degrees. In other words, every computational entity has its own 
co-operators whom the entity obtains data from or sends data to. So, at least, a 
distributed algorithm should endue each node with the following properties:
First of all, every node does not need to know the topology of the network, maybe 
composed by different kinds of entities, in advance. During the course of calculation, 
each node uses local and limited information from others to finish its own work. This 
does not mean that one’s opinion is one-sided. For example, Section 4.3.2 shows that 
one entity can hold a wider view using an iterative way in the distributed network.
In addition, one’s data should be available to other nodes by message passing, in 
order to promote computation efficiency and reduce resources costs. So, for another 
thing, the algorithm must be combined with a communication protocol for data 
sharing and hiding the heterogeneity o f the network. Without such a protocol, a 
distributed method could not be implemented. In Chapter 5, the AODV routing 
protocol based on the distributed EigenTrust algorithm is designed and developed.
4.3.2 Algorithm Description of Distributed EigenTrust
An expression about the distributed EigenTrust algorithm can be derived from 
equation (4-12). For clarity, expanding this equation we have
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' * r r In ••• I j] I mi ' g { * r " a "
=  0 - « ) l l i  • • • I ji  * * • / m/' + a P i
j r . Mxl /lM  * ’ ’ I jn ' ’ ’ Inn MXM .sik).Mxl - P n _
Hence
g<;M) = ( ! - « ) [ /„
Then
L I-JlxM
g\(*)
( k )
8 i
sik)
+  < * ' P t
nx 1
MX 1
(4-13)
(4-14)
g(*+i) + /2, +--- + lji - g{k) + ••• + /„, + (4-15)
Notice that g\k) is not functional in equation (4-15). That is to say, both g)k) and
la do not take part into the process of computing i ’s global reputation. Because 
one’s own opinion is probably too subjective to be true but the evaluation from 
others are more likely to be objective and accurate.
It should be noted that in equation (4-15) the unknown parameters are just 
neighbours’ evaluations about node i and their own global reputation. (The values 
of a  and p t have been assigned before computation.) Moreover, even though
there are n — 1 unknown items in equation (4-15), the actual amount is small 
because only those nodes connecting with the node i have the local reputation 
about it; that is, equation (4-15) is sparse. This leads to two benefits. On one aspect, 
the computation load is lightweight for each node. On another aspect, the data to be 
transferred over the network is little as well.
If the node i has m neighbours, equation (4-15) can be written as
g\k+X) = ( l -a ) - ( / i i  + L  ’g {2k) + " ’ + lmi -gn^ + a'Pi  (4-16)
As shown in Figure 4-5, each neighbour only needs to send its up-to-date global
reputation and local evaluation about the target node i. The rest calculations are
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handed over to the target that are responsible for synthesizing the reputation data into 
its own global reputation as described in the equation (4-16). The synthesized 
reputation will be sent to its neighbours (e.g. node j )  afterward for their own 
reputation calculation.
Figure 4-5 and equation (4-16) also show that f s  global reputation aggregates 
opinions of its neighbours including node i. Hence, gf*+1) also includes opinions
from the other neighbours of j .  Similarly, every neighbour of j  takes further nodes’ 
opinions into consideration. Thus, it can be deemed that i holds a global view over 
the entire network. Of course, it should be pointed out that one’s neighbours’ 
opinions are more weight for its global reputation than those distant nodes, because a 
distant neighbour’s opinion will be repeatedly weighted by each o f intermediate 
node’s local reputation, less than 1, before its opinion is considered by the node i. 
This is similar to the social network. One is more likely to adopt friends’ suggestions 
than those of unfamiliar persons.
Figure 4-5 Aggregation o f Reputation Data
Figure 4-6 describes the distributed EigenTrust algorithm. Particularly, node i 
initializes its global reputation ( g (0)) to p t before calculating. The constants a  
and p t have the same definition as we defined earlier. Then, if  the node has 
received all the necessary data from neighbours, its global reputation can be 
computed based on these external data. After that, g \k+I) and Uj are sent to i ’s
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neighbours that intend to compute their own global reputation. Finally, the residual 
error about global reputations in two adjacent iterations is computed and decides 
whether it is needed to do the next calculation loop or not.
Collect neighbours ’ data:
j i  s j  /
No
Yes 
 ][___
(  st°p )
Initialize: a , p {, g]
Send my data (/  ^ • to
neighbours
Compute my global reputation: 
r ( * + i )  _
Figure 4-6 Description of Distributed EigenTrust Algorithm
4.4 Issues and Solutions for Implementation
When the distributed EigenTrust algorithm integrates with the AODV routing 
protocol, both of them need to be modified. With respect to the modification to 
AODV, Chapter 5 will illustrate this in detail. The following subsections are mainly 
about the alteration to the algorithm.
4.4.1 Redefining Local Reputation
According to the credit rating method in Section 4.2.1, the local reputation can be
53
Swansea University
computed as the difference between the number of packets forwarded by a given 
neighbour successfully and the number of packets forwarded unsuccessfully. But in 
our implementation, the local reputation of one’s neighbour is redefined as the 
proportion of packets forwarded by the given neighbour in overall packets forwarded 
by all its neighbours.
4.4.2 Initial Values for Local and Global Reputations
The initial value of the local and the global reputation need to be carefully selected in 
the EigenTrust algorithm. The initial value of local reputation towards a given node 
is set to 0.01 because at the start-up phase packets have not been forwarded by the 
neighbour. The reason why the initial value takes 0.01 rather than zero will be 
explained in Section 4.4.3.
With respect to the normalization, local reputations about one’s m neighbours is 
rewritten as equation (4-17). If all the m neighbours have not forwarded any packet, 
their normalized local reputation will be a uniform probability distribution over them, 
namely [ l / « , l /m ,- , l /m ] t a .
h = - ~ -  (4‘ 1?)
Z
7= 1.
j* i
An assumption in our implementation is that every node should have been friendly,
so one’s initial global reputation is set to 1. And the initial global reputation must not
— (0)
take zero, because a non-zero starting vector g  is required in the EigenTrust 
algorithm. After several interactions with other nodes, a node can figure out a new 
global reputation that may be lower than its initial value.
4.4.3 Pre-trusted Nodes
As mentioned in Section 4.2.3, the existence o f pre-trusted nodes can ensure the 
convergence of equation (4-15). In practice, the selected pre-trusted nodes should not 
belong to a set of malicious nodes such that the performance of EigenTrust would not 
be compromised. So the authors in [4] suggested that the first few nodes joining a
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network could be regarded as trustworthy and these nodes should be selected as few 
as possible.
However, the selection method is still an open research area[3] and improper selection 
also compromises the convergence. Moreover, there is no method to count the 
number of the pre-trusted nodes in AODV. So a practical challenge is to guarantee 
the distributed EigenTrust convergent when no pre-trusted nodes are specified. The 
following will discuss the convergence of equation (4-18) in that situation.
g (,M ) =(lu •*<*> + / „ . * «  + . . .+ L - g ® )  (4-18)
The irreducibility and aperiodicity o f Lnxn, which are the convergence premise of
EigenTrust141, cannot always be achieved without the pre-trusted nodes. To overcome 
this limitation, the distributed EigenTrust is correspondingly modified in terms of the 
initial value and termination condition.
First, we consider the irreducibility. According to the definition of the irreducible 
matrix, an irreducible matrix has at least one non-zero off-diagonal element in each 
row and column^441. Hence, if  there is no zero element in the subdiagonal and 
superdiagonal of Lnxn, the irreducibility of the matrix can be warranted.
Take Figure 4-7, where ‘ x ’ represents a random value of the local reputation, as an 
example. It can be seen that the elements of the superdiagonal of Lnxn are created 
during the routing discovery of AODV and the superdiagonal values are set when the 
RREP is unicasting back to the RREQ source node. Thus, as long as the nodes in a 
route set a non-zero local reputation to their downstream and upstream neighbours, 
the irreducibility of Lnxn can be guaranteed. Therefore, the initial value of local 
reputation takes a decimal value near zero (e.g., 0.01) in equation (5-1).
h =
pktSj
i f  pktsj *  0;
pkts,0, '  1 (4-19)
0.01 otherwise
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Figure 4-7 An Irreducible Matrix 
On another aspect, it is assumed that the matrix Lnyn is said to have period k, 
namely Lk+[ = L where k is the least such positive integer. Hence we have
^ +1) k+\g  = L • g = L -g  = g  . According to the simulation results in Figure 4-2
and Figure 4-3, the residual error
-(*+i) -(*)
g  ~ g in the centralized algorithm
monotonically decreases over iterations. Similarly, for the distributed method, the
residual error 8  = should monotonically decrease over iterations as
well. Obviously, considering the periodicity of the matrix, at the (k + 1)"1 iteration 
the error £ (*+1) = |g (*+I) - g (*}|| can be written as £ (Ar+1) = ||g (,) - g (k) . Due to the
decrease of 8 , ||g(1) _ g (A° |2 will be much larger than 8 {k). Therefore, we can use
this significant change of 8  as a subsidiary condition for deciding whether to 
continue the calculation or not. In other words, if  8 {k+1) > 8 (k), the calculation 
process has to be stopped and waits for being restarted later; otherwise, it keeps 
going on. Before the (k + \)th iteration, the calculation can be considered as 
convergent.
Based on the above discussion, through modifying the initial value o f local 
reputation and adding the subsidiary termination condition, the convergence of the 
equation (4-18) can be guaranteed. The convergence is also proven in the experiment 
illustrated in Chapter 5.
4.5 Summary
The accuracy of intrusion detection is a challenge for an intrusion detection system. 
Although multi-point detection can significantly improve the accuracy compared 
with the single-source detection, the application of multi-source detection is limited
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by the reputation calculation methods. Therefore, EigenTrust is introduced to 
evaluate the consensus reputation for every node in a network. Because the 
convergence of EigenTrust would be compromised when no pre-trusted nodes are 
defined and there is no such nodes exist in AODV, the algorithm is improved to 
guarantee the convergence at the cost of reducing convergence rate when no trusted 
node is pre-defined. The corresponding implementation in AODV will be shown in 
the next chapter.
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5 A  R e p u ta t io n  B a se d  S e c u re  A O D V  fo r  W M N s
To overcom e the packet drop attack, a secure AO D V  is proposed and im plem ented in 
this chapter for intrusion detection in W M Ns. The protocol is nam ed AODV-ET 
whose reputation algorithm  has been presented in Chapter 4. The follow ing sections 
describe the protocol in detail.
5.1 M odifica tion  o f R R E Q
As described in Section 4.4, the RREQ routing m essage should include reputation 
inform ation in order to apply EigenTrust into AODV. Therefore, there is necessary to 
m odify the form at o f  the standard RREQ. As shown in Figure 5-1, there are two 
places highlighted in solid boxes different from a standard RREQ m essage.
A O D V  Reserved Field
Reputation
Extension
Type J | R | G | D | U 0 |  Extensions N u m
R R E Q  ID 
Destination IP Address 
Destination Sequence  N um ber
Hop Count
O rig inator IP Address
Originator Sequence N u m b er
Estimator IP A ddress
E stim ator Global Reputation
N eighbor IP Address
N eighbor Local Reputation
F ig u re  5-1 M e s sa g e  F o rm at  o f R R E Q  w ith  R e pu ta t io n  E x te n s io n
Like AO D V -REX |32], the first m odified is the reserved field o f  the standard RREQ 
which is 11 bits length, set as 0 and ignored on reception. That is to say, the field is 
not used by AODV, so m odifying it will not affect the process o f  RREQ operation in 
AODV. The value o f  the first bit, named ‘O ’, o f  this field represents w hether a RREQ 
m essage with reputation extensions or not. If  this bit is set to 1, the R R E Q ’s receiver 
will know that there are reputation extensions attached. M oreover, the rest 10 bits o f 
the field stand for the num ber o f  reputation extensions.
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Besides, reputation extensions are added at the end of the standard RREQ message. 
One extension includes four fields: Estimator IP Address, Estimator Global 
Reputation, Neighbour IP Address, and Neighbour Local Reputation. The first field 
stores the IP address of a rater. The following keeps global reputation o f the rater. 
The next two saves the ratee’s IP address and the evaluation that the rater puts on the 
ratee, respectively. If a rater has more than one neighbour (ratee), their corresponding 
reputation extensions will be one by one added at the end o f the RREQ which the 
rater creates and forwards.
5.2 Reputation Table
At every node, a structure variable named Reputation Table (RT) is defined as below.
typedef struct list t {
struct list t *prev, *next;
} list t;
struct Reputation Table {
struct in addr nghb addr; /* IP address of a neighbour */
float reputation; /* Global reputation of the neighbour*/
int nghb_pkt fwd; /* Number of packets forwarded to a neighbour */
list t Ink RT;
};
/* Link about RT */
A RT is used to encapsulate reputation information of one’s neighbour: the 
neighbour’s IP address and global reputation, as well as the number of packets 
forwarded by the neighbour. A node creates a RT for each neighbour and every RT is 
linked as a sequence by a list structure (Ink RT) that is efficient to insert a new RT 
anywhere and iterate over in forward or reverse order.
Notice that local reputation value about a neighbour is not included in this structure, 
because in fact the member nghb_pkt J w d , recording the number of packets that the 
neighbour has forwarded, is corresponding to the neighbour’s local reputation. This 
corresponding relation is shown in the equation (5-1). Besides, one node’s own 
global reputation value is separately saved in a pre-declared global variable.
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The creation of the RT can be done in the following two ways. If a node receives a 
RREQ from a neighbour, a RT will be created for the neighbour by the node. 
Likewise, when the node receives an unseen RREP from a neighbour, a new RT 
about this neighbour will also be established. In these ways, a node creates a RT for 
each neighbour.
5.3 Propagation o f  RREQ
As mentioned in Section 4.3.1, the AODV protocol is used to transfer required data 
for the EigenTrust algorithm. Specifically, before one node broadcasts a RREQ 
message, its global reputation and neighbours’ local reputations are computed and 
added into the message. When an intermediate node receives the RREQ, it computes 
its own global reputation using the corresponding data in extensions of the RREQ. 
Additionally, the intermediate node attaches its own reputation data to the RREQ and 
forwards the RREQ if needed. With the propagation o f RREQs, each node’s 
reputation data spreads over a network. The detailed explanation is as following.
5.3.1 Creation
According to the modified format of RREQ, the process of generating a RREQ for 
discovering a path to a destination in AODV-ET is described in Figure 5-2.
First, a node originates a standard RREQ message including flags, address 
information, sequence numbers and so on. Next, the first bit o f reserved field of the 
message is set to 1 so that a receiver can recognise prospective reputation extensions 
in the RREQ. Then the IP address and global reputation of the node (rater), as well as 
the IP address, local reputation of each neighbour (ratee), are stored in a structure 
array extRep. After that, the number of reputation extensions and the size o f the 
RREQ with the extension are updated so that a receiver can read reputation data in 
the RREQ and add new reputation extensions at correct place. Moreover, all 
members of the structure array are packed and placed in the rear of the RREQ one by 
one. Finally, the RREQ with extensions is sent to a Linux Kernel socket for 
broadcasting.
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Definitions:
-k: counter of extensions
-extRep: a structure array storing reputation data 
Process:
Create a standard RREQ;
Set flag bit of reputation extension; 
foreach neighbour j
{
extRep[k].rator_addr= localhost IP address;
extRep[k].reputation= global reputation;
extRep[k].ratee_addr= j's IP address;
extRep[k].local_reputation= j's local reputation;
k++;
}
Update: size of the RREQ with extensions, the number of extensions; 
Add elements of extRep[] to end of the RREQ;
Broadcast the RREQ wtih extensions on socket;
Figure 5-2 RREQ Creation
5.3.2 Reception
Due to the modification to RREQ, the reception process o f a RREQ in AODV-ET is 
slightly different from the AODV protocol. The difference is highlighted in Figure 
5-3.
The first difference is that a RREQ source node needs to receive any RREQ even if  
those are created by itself and then passed back from its neighbours. This is because 
the source needs to extract the reputation data about its neighbours from the RREQ 
in order to calculate its own global reputation. After picking out the needed 
information, the node drops the RREQ generated by itself. By contrast, in AODV a 
node should ignore its own RREQs at once when receiving them.
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F igure  5-3 F lo w c h a r t  o f  P ro c e s s in g  R R E Q s
Additionally, when receiving a new RREQ during route discovery, a node creates a 
new RT about its previous hop (upstream  neighbour) before the RREQ is processed. 
Then the reputation data included in each RREQ extension is used to update the
corresponding RT's content if  such fields can be found. Finally, the reputation
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calculation process, discussed in Section 5.4, is called to compute the current node’s 
global reputation according to the reputation data placed in RREQ extensions. 
Contrary to AODV-ET, for the new unprocessed RREQ, AODV will not do the above 
work but check local reverse routing table to decide whether to update the reverse 
route or to insert a new one to the RREQ source node.
If anything, a minor difference is to create a RREP for responding to a RREQ source 
node, which is shown in the bottom of Figure 5-3. The value of hop count in RREP is 
virtual hops rather than a real physical hop. Actually, the virtual hop count is the 
reputation metric described in Section 5.5.1.
5.3.3 Forwarding
If a node does not have a route to the destination of a received RREQ, it has one but 
the route has been invalid, or the route is not fresh enough, then the node will start a 
process forwarding the received RREQ.
Figure 5-4 shows this process. To begin with, the coming RREQ should be stored in 
a sending buffer so that prospective reputation extensions could attach to this RREQ, 
and its hop count should also be increased by 1. Then the current node checks its RTs 
to judge whether it owns such information that is not included in the extensions of 
the RREQ or not. If any, the data would be packed as a new extension and added to 
the end of the RREQ; otherwise, reputation information in extensions would be 
updated by its counterpart in RTs so that data in RREQ extensions is up-to-date. 
Finally, the RREQ with extensions is sent to the Linux Kernel socket for 
broadcasting to neighbours.
5.4 Reputation Calculation Process
5.4.1 Local Reputation Calculation
A neighbour’s local reputation is based on its behaviour history detected by the two 
modules explained in Section 5.6. Here we only concentrate on its calculation. 
Assume that the node j  is one of the node i ’s neighbours. The node i is able to
sense the number of packets forwarded by j  ( pktSj) and the number of packets
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sent out by all neighbours ( pktsU)l), as shown in Figure 5-7. A ccording to Section 
4.4.1 and 4.4.2, local reputation /. is com puted as follows:
p k ts .
Pkts,o,
0.01
i f  pkts j *  0; 
otherwise
(5-1)
N otice that if  there is no packet forw arded by all the neighbours, which m eans the 
connection has ju st been established, the initial value o f  local reputation o f  the 
neighbour j  is set to 0.01. Besides, before the local reputation is used in com puting 
one 's global reputation, it m ust be norm alized by equation (4-17).
Yes No
(  Stop )
^T tave  n e w ^  
reputation in 
\  R R E Q ? /
Buffer the 
received R R E Q
Increase hop 
count
Send R R E Q  with 
exts to socket
Attach the 
array as exts to 
the R R E Q
A dd new 
reputation data 
to the array
U pdate  m y rep 
data in the array
F igure  5-4  F lo w c h a r t  o f  F o rw a rd in g  R R E Q s
5.4.2 Global Reputation Calculation
The process o f  com puting the global reputation is a part o f  processing a received 
RREQ in AODV-ET. As highlighted in Figure 5-3, the function reputation process is
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called before one node updates or adds a reverse route. Particularly, Figure 5-5 shows 
the process of calculating one’s global reputation in detail.
For a received RREQ with reputation extensions, a node needs to find out its 
neighbours’ global reputations and local reputations about itself. To pick out the 
information, the first thing the node should do is to check if the Ratee IP Address of 
an extension matches the current node’s IP address and the rater is its neighbour or 
not. If a rater’s IP address can be found in a ratee’s RT, it is deemed that the rater is a 
neighbour of the ratee. Because one’s RT only stores its neighbour’s reputation data.
Finally, the result of each loop is accumulated to get a global reputation as shown in 
Figure 5-5 and equation (4-18). Besides, one should also update its rater’s global 
reputation in its RTs with the corresponding data in RREQ extensions so that the 
reputation metric is accurately computed in Section 0.
5.5 Route Selection
In general, establishment of a routing table in a routing protocol is subject to a link 
cost factor (external metric) associated with other entities in a network. Cost factors 
may be the distance to a destination, network throughput of a link, or link availability 
and reliability, expressed as simple unitless numbers[45]. As presented in Section 2.3.2, 
in AODV the hop count from a source to a destination is such a cost factor for 
selecting the shortest path. This provides a dynamic process of traffic load balancing 
between paths.
Unlike the AODV routing protocol, the establishment of a route entry in AODV-ET 
is governed by a combined factor: reputation metric.
5.5.1 Reputation Metric
The reason of introducing EigenTrust into the AODV-ET routing protocol is to assign 
the cost factor in AODV a property indicating the degree of reliability of a route for 
avoiding malicious nodes. For this purpose, the reputation metric, also named 
reputation hops, is used to represent virtual hops taking global reputation level and a 
real physical hop between two adjacent nodes into consideration.
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The metric is negative related to a node’s the global reputation value o f  each. In other 
words, a low global reputation leads to a long distance, while a higher one results in 
few er hops. As shown in form ula (5-2), the global reputation o f  the dow nstream  
neighbour j , g e [0,1], is converted to the reputation hop.
RHn -  round((1 -  g ;) • ND ) +1 (5-2)
where, reputation m etric RHn , may not equal to R H /t, denotes the hop count from 
i to j . It takes j ’s global reputation and the normal hop (constant 1) into account. 
Clearly, if  j  enjoys high enough reputation, RHu tends to the normal hop 1.
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Moreover, ND stands for the Network Diameter that specifies the maximum 
possible number o f hops between two nodes in a network. Besides, a round-up 
function is used to map a float number to an integer rather than the floor function 
applied in [32]. Because the round-up function can more obviously reflect the change 
of total hops of a route.
5.5.2 Most Trusted Path First
The creation of a new route is initiated by sending a RREQ and receiving a 
corresponding RREP message[33]. If several valid routes towards a destination exist, 
the destination can receive several RREQs. In basic AODV, a source selects the route 
with minimum number of hops to an intended destination, as explained in Section 
2.3.2.
Similarly, AODV-ET selects the most trustful route to a destination based on SPF 
(Short Path First). In order to select a reliable route, the destination in AODV-ET 
needs to answer every RREQ message that is forwarded towards it via different paths, 
rather than only reply the first coming RREQ like AODV. Two options can be 
considered for this situation. Either the choice of a path is decided by the RREQ 
source and the destination will be notified (source-oriented), or, conversely, the 
destination makes the decision and informs the source (destination-oriented)[33].
According to [32,33], the source-oriented approach is illustrated in Figure 5-6. It can 
be generalized to three steps. Firstly, the source node S broadcasts a RREQ. Secondly, 
the destination D receives several RREQs from different paths, and responds to each 
of them by a RREP which returns along the path which the RREQ traversed before. 
Finally, S receives several RREPs, each of which contains the metric representing 
reputation level of the path they walked through. And then S chooses the most 
trustworthy route and, if  requested, informs the destination by an acknowledge 
message.
In other words, each node in a route, except the source node, adds the reputation 
metric to Hop Count of a RREP to indicate a virtual distance to the destination that 
created the RREP. This distance takes the reputation of every intermediate node into
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account. W hen the source receives the RREP, it is able to recognise the 
trustw orthiness o f  the route to the intended destination by the value o f  Hop Count in 
the RREP.
Alternatively, the destination-oriented approach would proceed as follows. First o f  
all, S sends a RREQ by broadcast. W hen receiving the RREQ, interm ediate nodes 
update its hop count (reputation m etric) value and forward the updated RREQ. At 
last, the destination receives several RREQs including reputation hops o f  each path. 
It chooses the m ost reliable route and only sends a single RREP to the source along 
the route it selected. After received the RREP, the source updates or inserts a route to 
the destination in its routing table.
R R E Q
R R E P  1
F igure  5-6  S o u rc e -o r ien ted  A p p ro ac h
Obviously, the two approaches are different. In the first m ethod, the reputation metric 
is com puted w hen receiving and replying a RREQ. But the destination oriented way 
only perform s calculation and update o f  the m etric during the propagation o f  RREQ. 
In addition, the source node is responsible for selecting a trustworthy route based on 
received RREPs. In the destination oriented way, conversely, the destination node 
chooses the reliable route before sending a single reply so that the source can directly 
create or update a route when receiving the reply.
Hence, the destination oriented approach selects a reliable route quicker than its 
counterpart because the source node does not need to spend time com paring 
reputation m etrics o f  all received RREPs. Rem arkably, its inherited weakness is that 
the destination node m ust be trustful. I f  the destination replies a RREP with false 
reputation metric to attract netw ork traffic, perform ance o f  the destination-oriented 
m ethod would be reduced. However, the source oriented approach can avoid this
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issue because the reputation metric of a RREP can only be modified by the upstream 
node in a reverse route to the source. If unfortunately, a downstream node is 
malicious, its upstream neighbour would give it a low reputation leading to high hops 
so that the path through the malicious would not be selected. Therefore, the 
source-oriented approach is used in AODV-ET.
To validate AODV-ET, routing behaviour of packets should be monitored. Details 
about auditing routing o f data packets are illustrated in the following.
5.6 Misbehaviour Detection
Network Sniffer and Watchdog can be employed to monitor the behaviour o f a 
node’s neighbours. The former takes in charge of capturing and analysing data 
packets. The latter judges whether a packet is successfully forwarded. They are, 
respectively, described in detail as following.
5.6.1 Sniffing Principle
A Sniffer is a piece o f computer programme that can grab all or part of traffic passing 
over a network. The network sniffing technique can be applied to detect 
misbehaviour of an entity in a network, e.g., dropping packets. This is possible since 
the wireless channel is a broadcast medium; if the reception and transmission ranges 
are the same, every forwarding activity of a node can be sensed by all its 
neighbours1321, and vice versa.
Certainly, the application of sniffing technique depends on the mode of NIC 
(Network Interface Card). In a real system, a NIC is responsible for operation of 
packets, whose main job is to collect packets traversing through it. When the NIC 
receives a packet, it will decide whether to accept it or not based on its mode and the 
destination’s information included in the packet. The packets whose information is 
not on the need will be ignored. Generally speaking, there are four modes o f NIC:
(1) Broadcast: A NIC can receive broadcast messages over a network.
(2) Multicast: A NIC can receive messages from the same group with it. That is, a
packet can be received by more than one NICs belonging to the same group. They
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communicate with each other by a broadcast-style.
(3) Directory: A packet is only permitted to be received by the intended NIC of 
destination.
(4) Promiscuous: A NIC is able to receive any data passing through it.
By default, the NIC supports broadcast and directory mode, namely it can receive 
broadcast messages and the messages to itself. Specially, if a NIC intends to capture 
packets in a network, the promiscuous mode must be supported.
The application of sniffing technique, which is called network sniffer and based on 
Socket, Libpcap or WinPcap, enables a NIC to capture all o f the network packets in 
real-time passing through it. The sniffer, based on the Socket, only can respond to a 
broadcast packet whose destination MAC address is matching with its NIC’s MAC 
address. For other packets, it is unable to do anything.
However, the network sniffer using pcap {packet capture), consisting o f API 
(Application Programming Interface) functions, is able to capture all packets 
travelling through the local NIC. Therefore, the pcap is used by the sniffer in our 
implementation.
5.6.2 Network Sniffer Programming
The libpcap library is the pcap's Linux application, and its Windows counterpart is 
known as WinPcap. In AODV-ET, Libpcap is used to sniff network traffic and the 
design process[46] of corresponding sniffer is described as below.
1) Setting the device
First, it is essential to declare the name of the interface which we want to sniff on, 
such as ethO, wlanO, etc. There are two ways to do that. One is to get the interface 
name by a passed string variable or a character pointer, like:
char *dev_name = "wlanO";
The other is to use a function,pcap lookupnetQ, to return the interface name, e.g.:
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char *dev_name = pcap_lookupdev(errbuf);
The string variable errbuf stores an error description if the function pcaplookupdev  
fails.
For simplicity, in AODV-ET the first method is used to set the device which we wish 
to sniff on.
2) Opening for sniffing
Then, the next step is using the function pcap_open_live for opening the device to 
sniff, like:
pcap_t *handle = pcap_open_live (char *dev_name, int snaplen, int promise, 
int to_ms, char *errbuf);
Because libpcap supports listening to multiple interfaces, this function returns a 
session handle to differentiate the specific interface being sniffed on from other 
interfaces. In particular, the first argument indicates the interface which we want to 
sniff on. The snaplen is an integer that defines the maximum number of bytes to be 
captured. The third one promise, when set to true, brings the interface into 
promiscuous mode, not vice versa. The following argument, to ms, is the read time 
out in milliseconds, which means when the function works after a sufficient number 
of packets arriving. So a non-zero integer, e.g. 500, should be assigned to that 
argument. As mentioned above, the last errbuf is a string variable to store error 
messages. Finally, the function returns a session handler.
3) Set a traffic filter
After that, it is necessary to select out the specific type of packets (e.g. tcp, icmp or 
udp), which we are interested in, from all received packets. That is, filtering traffic. 
The filter of pcap is based on BPF (Berkeley Packet Filter[47], provide a raw interface 
to allow receiving packets destined to other hosts) that is more efficient and easier 
than users own if/else statements. Two API functions in libpcap, as below, can be 
used to complete the filtering task together.
/* compile the filter expression */
int pcap_compile(pcap_t *handle, struct bpf_program *fp, char *str, int
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optimize, bpf_u_int32 netmask);
/* apply the compiled filter */
int pcap_setfilter(pcap_t *handle, struct bpf_program *fp) ;
The function pcap compile compiles a filter expression before we apply BPF. It 
returns a negative integer, -1, on failure, and other values indicate success. 
Specifically, it is necessary to tell libpcap that which interface should be filtered so 
the first argument (session handle) is used to identify an interface. Following that is a 
reference to the place that stores the compiled version of the filter. Then comes the 
filter expression (e.g. icmp) in string format. Next one is an integer that decides 
whether the expression should be ‘optimized’ or not. Finally, the net mask o f the 
network which the filter applies to must be specified.
After the filter expression has been compiled, the second function pcap setfilter can 
apply the expression by the first two arguments to pcap compile, namely the session 
handle and filter version.
4) The actual sniffing
Finally, the function pcap loop starts a loop to capture packets. The prototype o f this 
function is as follows.
int pcap_loop(pcap_t *handle, int num_pkts, pcap_handler got_packet, 
u_char *user);
It will continue capturing packets until the count of packets (num_pkts) runs out. If 
the value of num_pkts is set to -1, the capture process will keep going on unless the 
application is forced to close. The preference got_packet is a handle of callback 
function that is an interactive interface with other applications, e.g., the watchdog 
module. The last argument is generally set as NULL.
Users can write some statements in the callback function got_packet to complete a 
specific task, such as dissecting a packet and print it to the user, saving it in a file, or 
doing nothing at all. In AODV-ET, the callback function determines whether a 
captured packet created by the local host have been forwarded by a given neighbour 
or not. Also it calls a function, process Jwd_packet, defined in watchdog module to 
judge whether a captured packet created by the local host has been forwarded by a
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given neighbour. If it does, the reputation of the given neighbour will increase. After 
sniffing work is finished, similar to a file operation, it still needs to clean up memory 
using the below two functions:
void pcap_freecode(&fp);
void pcap_close(handle);
5.6.3 Watchdog Module
The watchdog module of AODV-ET is a piece o f programme judging whether one 
node’s neighbour forwards data packets successfully. It aims to evaluate local 
reputation level about a neighbour based on observation of the sniffer mentioned 
above.
Specifically, when a data packet is sent to a neighbour (intermediate node), the 
watchdog stores information about the packet in a buffer and immediately activates a 
timer. If within timeout the sniffer senses a sent data packet whose information 
matches that one buffered before, the watchdog thinks that the data packet has been 
successfully forwarded to the given neighbour and increases the value of 
nghb_pkJwd in the RT corresponding to the neighbour, and deletes the buffered 
information; otherwise, if  the timeout happens, the watchdog will not increase the 
value of nghb_pk Jw d.
In order to estimate local reputation, a queue is used to record the observation results 
in [32] for considering past interactions between a node and its neighbour. In 
AODV-ET, however, the observation queue is discarded because the ratio between 
the number of data packets forwarded by a given neighbour and the total number of 
data packets forwarded by all neighbours is used to represent the local reputation 
about the given neighbour. The ratio also reflects a history of the neighbour’s 
behaviour in the past.
Of course, it indeed cannot avoid sporadic interference that is not caused by 
malicious actives. But this is insignificant. First of all, a small number of packets 
delivery failures, attributed to link failures, affect a neighbour’s local reputation 
slightly, compared with the intentional and periodical misbehaviour. Moreover, even
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if  the failure o f  link to a neighbour periodically happens in certain situation where 
there is no m alicious node, the neighbour can also be m arked with a low reputation 
to avoid being selected. So, that ratio not only indicates the evaluation to a neighbour 
but also availability and reliability o f  the link connecting to the node.
5.6.4 Cooperation between Watchdog and Sniffer
Figure 5-7 shows the relationship betw een the w atchdog and sniffer m odules.
A O D V -E T
Data packets
pkts j + +; reputation _process()
got_packet()
y packet forwardei 
by neighbor j ?
Yes
Sniffer M odule
process_f\vd_packets ()
Yes Timeout ?
No
Yes Buffered it?
No
W atchdog M odule
F ig u re  5-7 R e la t io n sh ip  b e tw ee n  W a tc h d o g  an d  Snif fer
The sniffer m odule takes in charge o f  capturing data packets going through the local 
host. It uses the function pcap loop to call the function got ja c k e t  for capturing and 
analysing a packet. By checking the IP header o f  packets, the sniffer can judge if  the 
host’s packet were forw arded by neighbours successfully. And then, the got_packet 
function calls the function process Jwd_pkt o f  w atchdog m odule to decide whether 
the captured packet is forw arded within a specific time. If  a tim eout occurs, the 
packet is deem ed to be forw arded unsuccessfully by the neighbour. In this case, node 
i only increase the value o f  pktstol. O therw ise, both pktsI and pktsl0, plus 1.
74
5 A Reputation Based Secure AODV for WMNs
The updated p k ts . and pktstot will be employed in calculating a node’s global 
reputation, if  such a process, reputation_process, is triggered by AODV-ET.
5.7 Experiment and Results
In the following sections, the protocol AODV-ET will be tested in a real indoor 
environment. First, descriptions of devices condition and setup for the test 
infrastructures are given out. Then the approach used to test this routing protocol is 
described. Finally, experimental results are presented.
5.7.1 Testbed Setup
1) Hardware Configuration
The testbed for AODV-ET consists of 4 computers: 1 laptop and 3 Dell desktops 
(Figure 5-8). Their configuration can be seen from Table 5-1. Because the wireless 
card is not embedded in this type of desktops, it is necessary to use the external 
wireless adaptor to perform wireless connection. In our experiment, the DWL-122 
adaptor of D-Link, compatible with 802.11n/b/g devices and supporting promiscuous 
mode, is employed. Of course, the wireless card of the laptop supports this listen 
mode as well.
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F ig u re  5-8 O n e  N o d e  o f  T estbed  
T ab le  5-1 T es tb ed  C o n f ig u ra t io n  List
Type D e sk to p s L a p to p
B rand Dell G X 5 2 0 L e n o v o  G 4 3 0
C P U Intel P e n tiu m  4 P ro c es so r  630 Intel D ual C o re  T 4 2 0 0
R A M 1G 2G
H ard  D isk 160G 2 5 0 G
W L A N  C ard D W L -1 2 2  U S B  w ire le ss  ad ap to r B ro a d c o m  B C M 4 3 1 2
2) Software Requirem ents 
Table 5-2 lists the basic inform ation about essential software for AODV-ET.
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Table 5-2 Software List
Type Name Version
Operating System Ubuntu 8.0.4.4
Linux Kernel Kernel 2.6.24-26-generic
RT73; 2009041204;
WLAN Card Driver
STA 5.100.82.112
Libpcap0.8; 0.9.8-2;
Packet Capture Tool
Libpcap0.8-dev 0.9.8-2
Compiler GCC 4.2.4
Ubuntu, a Linux distribution, is selected as the operating system of the testbed. The 
most important reason is that we developed AODV-ET on the basis of 
AODV-FUUREX[33] that is based on AODV-UU[48,49] firstly published by Uppsala 
University in Sweden. They both run as a user space daemon with Linux kernel 
2.6.x.
Moreover, our test infrastructures can meet the minimum requirements^ of Ubuntu 
desktop edition, such as 1 GHz CPU (x86 processor, Pentium 4 or better), 1 GB 
RAM (system memory) and 15 GB of hard-drive space.
Furthermore, compared with Debian, Ubuntu compiles its packages using GCC[51] 
features, such as buffer overflow protection. Such extra features greatly increase its 
security. Besides, Ubuntu based on the Debian Linux distribution is distributed as 
free and open source software.
For the above reasons, eventually, Ubuntu 8.04.4 whose kernel version is 
2.6.24-26-generic is installed on all testing machines.
3) Topology Setting
In order to test AODV-ET, the topology of the Ad hoc network is set as shown in
Figure 5-10. But, since we do not have a room large enough to deploy the four
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computers such that two neighbouring nodes are the only nodes within the 
transmission range of a given node, it is necessary to do some special setup to 
prevent the given node directly communicating to every possible destination node.
A built-in Linux tool iptables allowing dropping packets based on IP or MAC 
address is used to achieve that. The iptables is a user space command line program 
for configuring the Linux 2.4.x and 2.6.x IPv4 packet filtering ruleset[52]. The 
iptables package also includes ip6tables that is used for configuring the IPv6 packet 
filter.
There are four built-in tables in iptables, such as filter, nat, mangle and raw. In our 
experiment, only the first two tables are used. The filter is the default table. The filter 
table should be used exclusively for filtering packets. And the nat table should be 
mainly used for Network Address Translation. Packets in a stream only traverse this 
table once. If the first packet of a stream is allowed, the rest of the packets in the 
same stream will be subject to the same actions as the first packet.
As well as user-defined chains, each table contains some predefined chains such as 
PREROUTING, POSTROUTING, INPUT, FORWARD and OUTPUT. A chain is a 
series of rules that consists of conditions and an action specifying what to do with a 
matching packet. An action is called a ‘target’. There are a number of actions. For 
example, ACCEPT target means to let packets traverse through. Besides, a target 
DROP means to discard packets and will not carry out any further processing. If a 
packet meets a rule’s condition of one chain, the corresponding action specified by 
the rule’s target will be executed. Otherwise, the next rule of the chain will be 
checked.
As shown in Figure 5-9, the incoming packet flow left to right through one or more 
chains. Generally, all incoming packets come through the PREROUTING chain of 
the nat table which alters packets as soon as they come in; Incoming packets destined 
for the local host go through the INPUT chain of the filter table, no matter what 
interface or in which direction they came from; Local outgoing packets traverse 
through the OUTPUT chain of the filter table. Packets to be routed pass through the 
FORWARD chain of the filter,; Outgoing packets go through the POSTROUTING
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chain o f  the nat table.
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Therefore, the topology shown in Figure 5-10 can be built by executing the follow ing 
iptables com m ands at corresponding hosts.
Host A:
iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -s 192.168.182.200 -i ethO DROP
Host B:
iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -s 192.168.182.150 -i wlanO DROP
Host C:
iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -s 192.168.182.100 -i wlanO DROP
Host D:
iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -s 192.168.182.250 -i wlanO DROP
The option —t specifies to use the table nat rather than the default table {filter). 
Follow ing option -A  adds one rule to the end o f  the selected chain. Next specifies a 
netw ork IP address o f  the source host o f  a packet. Optionally, an interface nam e is 
explicated. The target indicates what to do with the packet that m atches the previous 
conditions.
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5.7.2 Experimental Results
1) Reputation Curve
A ssum e that host A in Figure 5-10 is the source node, and host D is the destination. 
The rest o f  nodes are responsible for forw arding the control and data packets. The 
test process is described as following.
At the beginning, after each host connected with its neighbours, the source started to 
send data packets to the destination by the com m and ping. W ithout any outside 
interference, the source random ly selected C to forw ard data to Z), even though B had 
the same initial global reputation value as C. As a result, the reputation o f  C jum ped 
to 1, because so far C forw arded all data packets com ing from the source host; By 
contrast, the global reputation o f  B was alm ost zero as shown in Figure 5-11.
A fter about one m inute, C was m anually set to deny forw arding data from A using 
iptables. Consequently, the global reputation o f  B began dram atically increasing to 
round 0.45 and the global reputation o f  C decreased to approxim ately 0.2. A fter the 
node B's global reputation surpassed the one o f  C, source node A started to choose B 
to forward packets rather than C, thus B's global reputation increased further.
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It can be seen that even though at first A selects C  to forward data, but, due to C is 
forced to drop packets from A for a long tim e, B whose global reputation begins to 
increase and finally replaces C to forward data to D.
O f course, if  m isbehaviour o f  B causes its own global reputation falling underneath 
C's global reputation in the future, the route to C will be re-selected again. In short, 
in AODV-ET the source node selects the relative trustful path to forward data 
packets.
2) Change o f  Hops
Correspondingly, the change o f  hops from A to D in this experim ent can be seen 
from Figure 5-12. At first, the pathl in Figure 5-10 was selected by the source and 
the distance to D was 2 because o f  no reputation penalty for node C. However, 
m isbehavior o f  C resulted in the reduction o f  its global reputation from 1 to 0.2. 
A ccording to equation (5-2), the hops o f  path l were calculated as follows:
r h ad = r h 4(. + r h , d
= [round (( 1 - g c ) • ND) + 1 ]  +  [round((1 -  g D)- ND) + 1 ]
= [round( ( \ -  0.2) x 30) +1] + [round ((1 -1 )  x 30) +1]
=  [round (24) + 1 ]  +  [0 + 1 ]
= 26
where ND m easures the m axim um  possible transm ission distance for a routing
request in a netw ork, thus its value m ust be a positive integer. But a large netw ork
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diameter can lead to significant delays for route discovery in the network. Here, 
assume its value is 30 in AODV-ET.
Meanwhile, the reputation of B increased from 0.01 to 0.02, so the hops o f path2 
were computed as follows:
R H a d  ~  R H a b  + R H b d
= [;round ((1 - g B)- ND) +1] + [round ((1 -  g D ) • ND) + 1]
= [round ((1 -  0.02) x 30) +1] + [round ((\ -1 ) x 30) +1]
= [round (29.4) +1] + [0 +1]
= 31
So far, the hops o f pathl (26) were less than the one of path2 (31), so the path to the 
destination still traversed through C even though behavior o f C had been abnormal. 
But when the reputation of B was higher than the one o f C, path2 was to be chosen 
by the source A. Later on, reputation of B jumped from 0.02 to 0.46, thus the hops of 
path2 fell from 31 to 18, less than the hops of pathl selected before. With the 
increase of the global reputation of B, hops of the path2 would be further reduced.
30
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Figure 5-12 Hops from the Source to the Destination 
3) Memory Usage
Table 5-3 presents information about memory consumption of two AODV
implementations: AODV-UU and AODV-ET. The first column VIRT means the total
amount of virtual memory in kilobytes which a task is able to access. It includes all
code, data and shared libraries plus memory shared with other tasks. RES stands for
the sum size in kilobytes of ‘text resident set’ and ‘data resident set’, which is an
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accurate representation of how much actual physical memory the task is using. SHR 
indicates how much of the VIRT size is actually sharable (memory or libraries) by 
the task.
Table 5-3 Memory Usage Comparison between AODV-UU & AODV-ET
Protocol
Implementation
Version VIRT (KiB) RES (KiB) SHR (KiB)
AODV-UU 0.9.6 1756 656 576
AODV-ET 0.1 10396 968 844
According to this Table, AODV-ET consumes nearly 50% more of actual physical 
memory used by AODV-UU. In addition, the total size of virtual memory consumed 
by AODV-ET is around 6 times as many as AODV-UU used. Those are because the 
sniffer module of AODV-ET is based on a few functions in the Libpcap library but 
the library is not used in AODV-UU. As a result, the whole library is mapped and 
counted in VIRT and SHR of AODV-ET. And the parts of the library file containing 
the functions being used increase the size of RES of AODV-ET as well.
4) Brief Discussion
In AODV-ET, every node is marked with the global reputation value to represent its 
reliability in a network. When a node is compromised by the packet drop attack, its 
global reputation value will be decreased and propagated by the RREQ extension 
during the routing discovery process. For example, in the above experiment, after 
node C had been hacked by the attack, its reputation information was transferred to 
node D with the help of RREQ and stored in D ’s reputation table. If D attempts to 
send data to A, it will also know how reliable C is.
Admittedly, AODV-ET increases the routing transmission overhead because of the 
extension, each of which occupies 128 bits. This could reduce the efficiency of the 
protocol. On the other hand, compared with the original AODV, AODV-ET protocol 
has a higher security and could increase the network throughput when a part of nodes
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are compromised by the attack.
5.8 Summary
This chapter illustrates the AODV-ET routing protocol and the corresponding 
experimental procedure. The secure protocol is able to switch from the route 
compromised by the packet drop attack to the relative trustworthy path for data 
transmission in our experimental environment. Namely, it can mitigate the effect of 
the node frequently dropping packets.
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6 Conclusions and Future Work
This thesis is concluded herein with a summary of my contributions and directions 
for future research.
6.1 Conclusions
An EigenTrust based AODV is proposed as an intrusion detection scheme, 
independently monitoring the routing of data packets and evaluating neighbourhood 
based on the auditing records, to mitigate the effect of the packet drop attack.
In particular, the EigenTrust algorithm is improved in initial value and termination 
condition to guarantee its convergence when no pre-trusted nodes are defined in 
AODV at the cost of reducing the convergence rate. Besides, the application of 
EigenTrust merges the data fusion layer and the reputation computation layer 
proposed in [5,53].
Moreover, the format of RREQ and its corresponding processing procedure are both 
altered and illustrated in this paper, in order to propagate reputation information and 
calculate the global reputation.
Furthermore, the reputation based AODV (AODV-ET) is implemented in Linux and 
tested in an office environment to evaluate its functionality and effectiveness. 
Experimental results show that AODV-ET is able to switch from the route 
compromised by the packet drop attack to the relative reliable route.
6.2 Future Work
The feasibility o f AODV-ET has been demonstrated in this thesis, but the 
performance parameters have not been measured, such as network throughput, 
end-to-end delay and out-of-order delivery percentage. In fact, AODV was designed 
for large scale ad-hoc networks, so valuable performance parameters o f AODV-ET 
should be accessed by network simulation tools.
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According to the Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format (IDMEF) 
Communication Protocol Requirements^, a message’s integrity, confidentiality and 
authenticity should be guaranteed by a proper encryption algorithms. Fortunately, 
another secure AODV protocol^51, using the RSA algorithm to protect the security of 
messages in these aspects, has also been developed on the basis of AODV-UU. So, 
its encryption code could be ported into the AODV-ET protocol for achieving those 
three security objectives. But, due to time limitation, the work has not been 
accomplished so far.
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